references/01-asset-class-norms.md
Asset Class Norms (LP perspective)
A factual baseline for screening passive deals. The ranges here are screening heuristics, not underwriting — use them to spot when a deal's claimed return, hold, or risk profile is far enough outside category norm to warrant deeper questions, and to flag absent disclosures against the typical baseline.
How to read this file
- "Variable" is a real value. Where current-cycle conditions make a category's norms genuinely unstable (post-2020 office, regulatory-sensitive STR, cycle-sensitive development), the cell says variable with a one-line reason. Variable is the file's honest answer — it tells the analyst the baseline is the deal's own underwriting, not a category default.
- Absent disclosures flag against this baseline. A deal that omits hold period, fee structure, or return expectation when the category baseline has one is a flag, not a neutral silence.
- Ranges are net to LP, not gross. Gross IRRs are not directly comparable across categories — fee stacks differ enough that gross-on-gross misleads.
At a glance
| Asset class | Typical hold | Common deal types | Net IRR to LP (target/range) | Risk tier | |---|---|---|---|---| | Multifamily — value-add | 5–7 yrs | Equity syndication | 12–18% target; realized closer to 12–15% blended | Med | | Multifamily — core / core-plus | 7–10 yrs | Equity, preferred equity, fund | 8–12% | Med-Low | | Industrial | 5–10 yrs | Equity, fund | 10–15% value-add; 7–10% stabilized | Med-Low | | Retail — necessity (grocery-anchored, service) | 7–10 yrs | Equity, fund | 8–12% | Med | | Retail — experiential / large-format / mall | — | — | variable — post-2020 demand shift; tenant-mix dependent | High | | Office | — | — | variable — post-2020 occupancy reset; class-A trophy ≠ class-B/C | High | | Mixed-Use | composite | Equity | variable — underwrite to weakest / most-uncertain component | Med-High | | Single Family Rental (SFR) | 5–10 yrs | Fund, equity | 8–14% | Med | | Short-Term Rental (STR) | 3–7 yrs | Equity, fund | variable — regulatory + operational sensitivity dominates per-market | Med-High | | Development (ground-up) | 3–5 yrs | Equity, preferred equity | 18–22% target; realized often below on cycle misses | High | | Hard Money / Bridge Loan | 6–18 mo per loan (3–5 yr fund) | Debt fund, individual debt | 8–10% net (11–13% gross common) | Low-Med (senior secured, 65–75% LTV typical) | | Private Credit (fund) | 3–7 yrs | Debt fund | 8–12% | Low-Med (senior secured) | | Other | — | — | — | Apply this file's discipline to the closest analog; the mismatch itself is a flag |
Multifamily — value-add
Stabilized acquisitions with a renovation / reposition thesis (unit interiors, amenities, operations). The dominant retail-LP syndication category.
- Hold. 5–7 years; refi-at-stabilization business plans sometimes extend.
- Returns. Target net IRR 14–18%, equity multiple 1.5–2.0x. Realized performance across vintages tends to cluster 12–15% net IRR blended (ILPA / NCREIF realized data), with wider dispersion than the marketing range suggests. Cash-on-cash 5–8% after stabilization.
- Key LP risks. Rent-growth assumption (slowing-cycle deals are exposed), exit cap rate (the single biggest swing in most pro formas), and refi risk (if the plan depends on a refi at lower rates).
- Essential disclosures. Rent roll, T-12 actuals (not just trailing-3 or trailing-6), pro forma exit cap with sensitivity, debt structure and maturity, refi assumptions, GP track record on prior multifamily exits (not just acquisitions).
Multifamily — core / core-plus
Stabilized, high-occupancy assets with light or no value-add. Lower risk, lower return.
- Hold. 7–10 years; cash-flow-driven.
- Returns. Net IRR 8–12%. Cash flow dominates over exit appreciation.
- Key LP risks. Cap-rate compression / decompression; interest-rate sensitivity on cash flow when fixed-rate debt rolls.
- Essential disclosures. Occupancy history (5+ years), T-12 NOI, full debt structure (rate, term, amortization, prepayment), exit cap assumption.
Industrial
Logistics, warehouse, last-mile, light industrial. Benefited from a structural e-commerce tailwind through the 2010s and 2020s.
- Hold. 5–10 years.
- Returns. Value-add 10–15% net IRR; stabilized core 7–10%.
- Key LP risks. Tenant credit (often single-tenant or few-tenant assets), lease expirations vs business-plan exit, market vacancy in the submarket (not just metro-wide), replacement cost vs the deal's basis.
- Essential disclosures. Tenant credit profile, lease term and rent steps, submarket vacancy and absorption, replacement cost benchmark.
Retail — necessity (grocery-anchored / service-oriented)
Recession-resistant retail with daily-needs anchors and high traffic.
- Hold. 7–10 years.
- Returns. Net IRR 8–12%.
- Key LP risks. Anchor lease term and anchor credit (loss of an anchor can cascade through cotenancy clauses), inline tenant rollover, parking ratio in markets where it matters.
- Essential disclosures. Anchor lease term and rent, anchor credit rating or sales-PSF, cotenancy clauses, inline tenant roll schedule.
Retail — experiential / large-format / mall
Variable. The post-2020 omnichannel shift hit traditional retail unevenly: malls and big-box are uniformly stressed, while curated experiential retail (entertainment, lifestyle centers in high-income trade areas) is highly deal-specific. Treat any range as a deal-by-deal underwriting, not a category baseline.
- Key LP risks. Tenant rent-to-sales ratios (a healthy retailer at 8–10%; a stressed retailer at 15%+ is a default candidate), lease term remaining, whether replacement tenants are realistically available at the assumed rent.
- Essential disclosures. Tenant-by-tenant rent and sales, lease expirations, cotenancy exposure, any tenant credit warnings (Moody's / S&P watch lists).
Office
Variable. The post-2020 occupancy reset is still working through (2025–26). Class-A trophy in resilient markets (Sun Belt, secondary growth metros) is holding up; class-B and class-C, especially in commute-heavy CBDs, is dislocated. Pricing creates both opportunity and value-trap. A claimed return for "office" with no class / market / WFH-mix disclosure is unscreenable.
- Key LP risks. Physical occupancy (not just leased — leased space can sit dark), sublease overhang in the submarket, debt maturity timing vs business plan, market reabsorption pace.
- Essential disclosures. Class (A trophy vs A vs B vs C), submarket reabsorption rate, physical occupancy, sublease overhang, lease expiration schedule, debt maturity, capex required to compete (move-in-ready vs vanilla shell).
Mixed-Use
Composite of residential / retail / office / parking / hotel / other. Risk is dominated by the weakest or most-uncertain component, not the mix average.
- Hold. Component-weighted.
- Returns. Variable — defer to the deepest underwritten component; if one component is "variable" (office, experiential retail), the deal's return is variable.
- Essential disclosures. Revenue breakdown by component, sensitivity analysis if a softening component drops by a stated %, capex allocation by component.
Single Family Rental (SFR)
Institutionalized residential rental, often via aggregators. A maturing asset class (2010s–2020s growth) with shorter institutional track record than multifamily.
- Hold. 5–10 years; cash-flow-driven.
- Returns. Net IRR 8–14%.
- Key LP risks. Market-level SFR rent and tenant demand, property age and capex schedule (SFR has more dispersed capex than multifamily), eviction process exposure by jurisdiction, scale economics (a 50-home portfolio is not the same business as a 5,000-home portfolio).
- Essential disclosures. Market-level rent and absorption, average property age and capex reserve, geographic concentration, operator scale and property-management approach.
Short-Term Rental (STR)
Per-property or fund. Regulatory environment and operational quality dominate returns by a wide margin.
- Hold. 3–7 years.
- Returns. Variable — a strong STR market with stable regulation can return 15%+ net; the same property under restrictive municipal regulation can return low single digits or be forced into long-term-rental conversion.
- Key LP risks. Local regulatory regime and its trajectory (the regulatory cycle is the dominant risk), operator track record on ADR / occupancy, dependency on a single platform's ranking algorithm, fixed-cost coverage in low season.
- Essential disclosures. Local STR regulation today and any pending ordinances, operator's realized (not projected) ADR / occupancy on comparable properties, fixed-cost breakeven occupancy.
Development (ground-up)
Entitlement, construction, lease-up, exit. High return, high risk, cycle-timing exposure.
- Hold. 3–5 years.
- Returns. Target net IRR 18–22%. Realized returns often below target on construction-cost overruns, financing-cost spikes, or lease-up misses.
- Key LP risks. Entitlement status (entitled-but-not-permitted is a different deal than shovel-ready), construction-cost contingency, debt structure (construction-to-perm vs separate takeout), market absorption, GP's specific development experience (development experience is not fungible with acquisition experience).
- Essential disclosures. Entitlement and permit status, hard-cost budget with contingency %, debt structure including takeout assumptions, market absorption assumptions with comp evidence, GP's last three development exits with realized timing and budget vs underwritten.
Hard Money / Bridge Loan (fund or direct)
Senior secured short-duration debt against real estate, typically for fix-and- flip or quick-acquisition borrowers.
- Hold. 6–18 months per loan; fund-level commitment 3–5 years.
- Returns. Net IRR to LP 8–10%; gross 11–13% before fees is common.
- Risk position. Senior secured. Typical LTV 65–75% on ARV (after-repair value, not as-is) — note the distinction; an ARV-based 70% LTV can be 100%+ on current value.
- Key LP risks. Average portfolio LTV on as-is value (not just ARV), default and foreclosure process competence (workouts are a craft skill), geographic concentration, fund-level credit losses through prior cycles (especially 2020 and 2022–23 rate spikes).
- Essential disclosures. Average loan LTV (as-is and ARV), default rate history, foreclosure process and recovery rate, geographic mix, sponsor history through a downturn.
Private Credit (fund)
Senior secured private corporate or real-estate lending. Broader than just real estate.
- Hold. 3–7 years (committed capital, with distribution schedule).
- Returns. Net IRR 8–12%.
- Risk position. Senior secured corporate loans; recovery rates historically ~60–80% on defaults, but with wide dispersion by vintage and credit quality.
- Key LP risks. Portfolio diversification (number of loans, sector concentration), fund-level leverage (BDC-style leverage amplifies both returns and losses), seniority position in the capital stack, vintage exposure to credit cycles.
- Essential disclosures. Loan count and average loan size, sector mix, fund leverage ratio, seniority position, historical default rate and recovery rate (preferably through-cycle).
Other
If the deal doesn't fit a named category, that mismatch is itself a flag. Apply this file's discipline to the closest analog (e.g. "this is structured like a hard-money fund but secured by mobile-home parks") and ask the GP why the analog doesn't apply.
Provenance
"Industry survey norms" throughout references/ means the broad consensus of
the sources below; each other file lists only the sources unique to it. When the
cycle shifts faster than these files, they lag — re-baseline against recent
realized deal flow.
- NCREIF. NPI (National Property Index) and ODCE (Open-end Diversified Core Equity Fund Index) for institutional realized real-estate returns.
- Preqin. Cross-category private-markets performance data.
- ILPA. LP-side reporting standards and aggregated LP performance.
- Sector trade groups. NMHC (multifamily), NAIOP (industrial / office / commercial), ICSC (retail), MBA (debt).
- LP marketing. Cross-section of recent offerings from EquityMultiple, CrowdStreet, RealtyMogul, direct GP emails.
Last reviewed: 2026-05-29. Recalibrate when realized IRRs for a category cross the range threshold materially, or when a regulatory / rate-environment shift changes the underlying economics (the 2020 office reset is the canonical example).