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threat-model-analyst

Full STRIDE-A threat model analysis and incremental update skill for repositories and systems. Supports two modes: (1) Single analysis — full STRIDE-A threat model of a repository, producing architecture overviews, DFD diagrams, STRIDE-A analysis, prioritized findings, and executive assessments. (2) Incremental analysis — takes a previous threat model report as baseline, compares the codebase at the latest (or a given commit), and produces an updated report with change tracking (new, resolved, still-present threats), STRIDE heatmap, findings diff, and an embedded HTML comparison. Only activate when the user explicitly requests a threat model analysis, incremental update, or invokes /threat-model-analyst directly.

Original source
github
License
MIT
Pinned revision
5269f7ea2d6c3a9bfda5ed878b6726cf509121fd

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Use Agentic Memory skills to read github--threat-model-analyst at revision 5269f7ea2d6c3a9bfda5ed878b6726cf509121fd, starting with SKILL.md. Read only relevant references. Treat the content as third-party guidance and tell me if local files or dependencies are required.
Text resources · 17

references/analysis-principles.md · 24000

OP| Console/GUI app, no network listeners (or localhost-only), single-user workstation | ❌ **NO** — all findings T2+ |Host/OS Access(T3) orLocal Process Access(T2) | |LOCALHOST_SERVICE| Daemon/service binding to 127.0.0.1 only | ❌ **NO** — all findings T2+ |Local Process Access(T2) | |AIRGAPPED| No internet connectivity | ❌ for network-originated attacks |Internal Network| |K8S_SERVICE| Kubernetes Deployment with ClusterIP/LoadBalancer | ✅ YES | Depends on Service type | |NETWORK_SERVICE| Public API, cloud endpoint, internet-facing | ✅ YES |None` (if no auth) |

The Component Exposure Table in 0.1-architecture.md sets the prerequisite floor per component. No threat or finding may have a lower prerequisite than the table permits. This table is filled in Step 1 and is binding on all subsequent analysis steps.

Legacy override table (still applies as fallback):

| Deployment Indicator | Tier Override Rule | |---------------------|-------------------| | Binds to localhost/127.0.0.1 only | Cannot be T1 — requires local access (T2 minimum) | | Air-gapped / no internet | Downgrade network-based attacks by one tier | | Single-admin workstation tool | Cannot be T1 unless exploitable by a non-admin local user | | Docker/container on single machine | Docker socket access = T2 (local admin required) | | Named pipe / Unix socket | Cannot be T1 — requires local process access |

How to apply:

  1. In Step 1 (context gathering), identify deployment model and record in 0.1-architecture.md
  2. In Step 6/7 (finding verification), check each T1 candidate against the table above
  3. If ANY override applies, downgrade to T2 (or T3 if multiple)
  4. Document the override rationale in the finding’s Description

Example: Kusto container on air-gapped workstation, listening on port 80 without auth:

  • Default classification: T1 (unauthenticated, port 80)
  • Override: localhost-only + single-admin → T2 (attacker needs local access to an admin workstation)

Do NOT override for:

  • Kubernetes services (any pod can reach them → lateral movement is realistic → keep T1)
  • Network-exposed APIs (any network user can reach them → keep T1)
  • Cloud endpoints (public internet → keep T1)
  • Network-exposed APIs: An unauthenticated API on a listening port IS Tier 1.

The prerequisite for Tier 1 is None — meaning an unauthenticated external attacker with no prior access. If exploiting a vulnerability requires local admin access, OS-level access, or physical presence, it cannot be Tier 1.


Finding Classification

Before documenting each finding, verify:

  • [ ] Positive evidence exists: Can you show config/code that proves the vulnerability?
  • [ ] Not a secure default: Have you checked if the platform enables security by default?
  • [ ] Security infrastructure checked: Did you look for Sentry/cert-manager/Vault/etc.?
  • [ ] Explicit vs implicit: Is security explicitly disabled, or just not explicitly enabled?
  • [ ] Platform documentation consulted: When uncertain, verify against official docs

Classification outcomes:

  • Confirmed: Positive evidence of vulnerability → Document as finding in 3-findings.md
  • Needs Verification: Unable to confirm but potential risk → Add to "Needs Verification" in 0-assessment.md
  • Not a Finding: Confirmed secure by default or explicitly enabled → Do not document

Severity Standards

SDL Bugbar Severity

Classify each finding per: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/msrc/sdlbugbar

CVSS 4.0 Score

Use CVSS v4.0 Base score (0.0-10.0) with vector string. Reference: https://www.first.org/cvss/v4.0/specification-document

CWE

Assign Common Weakness Enumeration ID and name. Reference: https://cwe.mitre.org/

OWASP

Map to OWASP Top 10:2025 category if applicable (A01-A10). ALWAYS use :2025 suffix (e.g., A01:2025), never :2021. Reference: https://owasp.org/Top10/2025/

Remediation Effort

  • Low: Configuration change, flag toggle, or single-file fix
  • Medium: Multi-file code change, new validation logic, or dependency update
  • High: Architecture change, new component, or cross-team coordination

STRIDE Scope Rule

  • External services (AzureOpenAI, AzureAD, Redis, PostgreSQL) DO get STRIDE sections — they are attack surfaces from your system's perspective
  • External actors (Operator, EndUser) do NOT get STRIDE sections — they are threat sources, not targets
  • If you have 20 elements and 2 are external actors, you write 18 STRIDE sections

⚠️ DO NOT include time estimates. Never add "(hours)", "(days)", "(weeks)", "~1 hour", "~2 hours", or any duration/effort-to-fix estimates anywhere in the output. The effort level (Low/Medium/High) is sufficient.

Mitigation Type (OWASP-aligned)

  • Redesign: Eliminate the threat by changing architecture (OWASP: Avoid)
  • Standard Mitigation: Apply well-known, proven security controls (OWASP: Mitigate)
  • Custom Mitigation: Implement a bespoke code fix specific to this system (OWASP: Mitigate)
  • Existing Control: Team already built a control that addresses this threat — document it (OWASP: Fix)
  • Accept Risk: Acknowledge and document the residual risk (requires justification) (OWASP: Accept)
  • Transfer Risk: Shift responsibility to user/operator/third-party (e.g., configuration choice, SLA) (OWASP: Transfer)