references/analysis-principles.md · 24000
OP| Console/GUI app, no network listeners (or localhost-only), single-user workstation | ❌ **NO** — all findings T2+ |Host/OS Access(T3) orLocal Process Access(T2) | |LOCALHOST_SERVICE| Daemon/service binding to 127.0.0.1 only | ❌ **NO** — all findings T2+ |Local Process Access(T2) | |AIRGAPPED| No internet connectivity | ❌ for network-originated attacks |Internal Network| |K8S_SERVICE| Kubernetes Deployment with ClusterIP/LoadBalancer | ✅ YES | Depends on Service type | |NETWORK_SERVICE| Public API, cloud endpoint, internet-facing | ✅ YES |None` (if no auth) |
The Component Exposure Table in 0.1-architecture.md sets the prerequisite floor per component. No threat or finding may have a lower prerequisite than the table permits. This table is filled in Step 1 and is binding on all subsequent analysis steps.
Legacy override table (still applies as fallback):
| Deployment Indicator | Tier Override Rule |
|---------------------|-------------------|
| Binds to localhost/127.0.0.1 only | Cannot be T1 — requires local access (T2 minimum) |
| Air-gapped / no internet | Downgrade network-based attacks by one tier |
| Single-admin workstation tool | Cannot be T1 unless exploitable by a non-admin local user |
| Docker/container on single machine | Docker socket access = T2 (local admin required) |
| Named pipe / Unix socket | Cannot be T1 — requires local process access |
How to apply:
- In Step 1 (context gathering), identify deployment model and record in 0.1-architecture.md
- In Step 6/7 (finding verification), check each T1 candidate against the table above
- If ANY override applies, downgrade to T2 (or T3 if multiple)
- Document the override rationale in the finding’s Description
Example: Kusto container on air-gapped workstation, listening on port 80 without auth:
- Default classification: T1 (unauthenticated, port 80)
- Override: localhost-only + single-admin → T2 (attacker needs local access to an admin workstation)
Do NOT override for:
- Kubernetes services (any pod can reach them → lateral movement is realistic → keep T1)
- Network-exposed APIs (any network user can reach them → keep T1)
- Cloud endpoints (public internet → keep T1)
- Network-exposed APIs: An unauthenticated API on a listening port IS Tier 1.
The prerequisite for Tier 1 is None — meaning an unauthenticated external attacker with no prior access. If exploiting a vulnerability requires local admin access, OS-level access, or physical presence, it cannot be Tier 1.
Finding Classification
Before documenting each finding, verify:
- [ ] Positive evidence exists: Can you show config/code that proves the vulnerability?
- [ ] Not a secure default: Have you checked if the platform enables security by default?
- [ ] Security infrastructure checked: Did you look for Sentry/cert-manager/Vault/etc.?
- [ ] Explicit vs implicit: Is security explicitly disabled, or just not explicitly enabled?
- [ ] Platform documentation consulted: When uncertain, verify against official docs
Classification outcomes:
- Confirmed: Positive evidence of vulnerability → Document as finding in
3-findings.md - Needs Verification: Unable to confirm but potential risk → Add to "Needs Verification" in
0-assessment.md - Not a Finding: Confirmed secure by default or explicitly enabled → Do not document
Severity Standards
SDL Bugbar Severity
Classify each finding per: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/msrc/sdlbugbar
CVSS 4.0 Score
Use CVSS v4.0 Base score (0.0-10.0) with vector string. Reference: https://www.first.org/cvss/v4.0/specification-document
CWE
Assign Common Weakness Enumeration ID and name. Reference: https://cwe.mitre.org/
OWASP
Map to OWASP Top 10:2025 category if applicable (A01-A10).
ALWAYS use :2025 suffix (e.g., A01:2025), never :2021.
Reference: https://owasp.org/Top10/2025/
Remediation Effort
- Low: Configuration change, flag toggle, or single-file fix
- Medium: Multi-file code change, new validation logic, or dependency update
- High: Architecture change, new component, or cross-team coordination
STRIDE Scope Rule
- External services (AzureOpenAI, AzureAD, Redis, PostgreSQL) DO get STRIDE sections — they are attack surfaces from your system's perspective
- External actors (Operator, EndUser) do NOT get STRIDE sections — they are threat sources, not targets
- If you have 20 elements and 2 are external actors, you write 18 STRIDE sections
⚠️ DO NOT include time estimates. Never add "(hours)", "(days)", "(weeks)", "~1 hour", "~2 hours", or any duration/effort-to-fix estimates anywhere in the output. The effort level (Low/Medium/High) is sufficient.
Mitigation Type (OWASP-aligned)
- Redesign: Eliminate the threat by changing architecture (OWASP: Avoid)
- Standard Mitigation: Apply well-known, proven security controls (OWASP: Mitigate)
- Custom Mitigation: Implement a bespoke code fix specific to this system (OWASP: Mitigate)
- Existing Control: Team already built a control that addresses this threat — document it (OWASP: Fix)
- Accept Risk: Acknowledge and document the residual risk (requires justification) (OWASP: Accept)
- Transfer Risk: Shift responsibility to user/operator/third-party (e.g., configuration choice, SLA) (OWASP: Transfer)