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data-breach-blast-radius

Pre-breach impact analysis: inventories sensitive data (PII, PHI, PCI-DSS, credentials), traces data flows, scores exposure vectors, and produces a regulatory blast radius report with fine ranges sourced verbatim from GDPR Art. 83, CCPA § 1798.155(a), and HIPAA 45 CFR § 160.404. Cost benchmarks from IBM Cost of a Data Breach Report (annually updated). All citations in references/SOURCES.md for verification. Use when asked: "assess breach impact", "what data could be exposed", "calculate blast radius", "data exposure analysis", "how bad would a breach be", "quantify data risk", "sensitive data inventory", "data flow security audit", "pre-breach assessment", "worst-case breach scenario", "breach readiness", "data risk report", "/data-breach-blast-radius". For any stack handling user data, health records, or financial information. Output labels law-sourced figures (exact) vs heuristic estimates (planning only). Does not replace legal counsel.

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License
MIT
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references/blast-radius-calculator.md

Blast Radius Calculator

Formulas, scoring matrices, and estimation heuristics for quantifying how many people, records, and systems would be affected by a data breach in the codebase under analysis.


Core Blast Radius Formula

Blast Radius Score (BRS) = Tier_Weight × Exposure_Likelihood × Population_Scale × Completeness_Factor × Context_Multiplier

Score ranges:

  • 0–25: Low — limited exposure, few records
  • 26–50: Medium — meaningful exposure, focused population
  • 51–75: High — significant exposure, broad regulatory consequences
  • 76–100: Critical — catastrophic exposure, immediate action required

Factor 1: Tier Weight (T)

Based on the data classification tier from data-classification.md:

| Tier | Label | Weight | |------|-------|--------| | T1 | Catastrophic | 5.0 | | T2 | Critical | 4.0 | | T3 | High | 3.0 | | T4 | Elevated | 2.0 | | T5 | Standard | 1.0 |

Rule: When multiple tiers exist in the same exposure vector, use the highest tier weight.

Aggregation uplift: If 3+ fields from different tiers are exposed together, add +0.5 to the highest tier weight (aggregation attack risk).


Factor 2: Exposure Likelihood (E)

How likely is this vector to be exploited in a realistic breach scenario?

| Likelihood Score | Label | Criteria | |-----------------|-------|---------| | 1.0 | Certain | Data is publicly accessible today (no auth required) | | 0.9 | Near Certain | Auth bypass is trivial (e.g., IDOR on sequential IDs, broken JWT validation) | | 0.8 | Very Likely | Auth required but missing for this specific endpoint; or data leaked in logs accessible by most engineers | | 0.7 | Likely | Auth required but over-broad access (all users can see all data); missing field-level access control | | 0.6 | Moderate | Requires privilege escalation or chaining with another bug; internal system with broad developer access | | 0.5 | Possible | Requires significant attacker effort but no defense-in-depth; DB accessible from dev environment | | 0.3 | Unlikely | Multiple security controls in place; but controls are not verified by the codebase review | | 0.1 | Remote | Strong defense-in-depth: encryption, field masking, proper authz, rate limiting, anomaly detection all present |


Factor 3: Population Scale (P)

Normalize the estimated number of affected records to a 0–1 scale.

Estimating Record Counts

Step 1: Look for explicit signals in the codebase

# Strong signals (use these if found):
- README mentions user count ("serves 5M users")
- Seeder/fixture files with record counts
- Migration comments ("adding index for 50K users")
- Analytics dashboards or monitoring configs mentioning scale
- Infrastructure configs (DB instance size implies scale):
  - db.t3.micro → < 10K active users
  - db.r5.large → 10K–500K users
  - db.r5.4xlarge / Aurora Serverless → > 500K users

# Medium signals:
- App category (SaaS product → higher, internal tool → lower)
- Multi-tenant vs. single-tenant architecture
- Presence of sharding or partitioning in DB schema

# Weak signals:
- Tech stack alone (no reliable correlation to user count)

Step 2: Apply default estimates when no signals are found

| Application Type | Conservative Estimate | Typical Estimate | |-----------------|----------------------|-----------------| | Internal corporate tool | 100–1,000 | 500 | | B2B SaaS (small/startup) | 1,000–10,000 | 5,000 | | B2B SaaS (established) | 10,000–100,000 | 50,000 | | B2C app (consumer startup) | 10,000–100,000 | 50,000 | | B2C app (growth stage) | 100,000–1,000,000 | 500,000 | | B2C app (scale) | 1,000,000–100,000,000 | 10,000,000 | | Healthcare system | 1,000–100,000 | 20,000 | | Financial services | 5,000–500,000 | 50,000 | | Government / public sector | 10,000–10,000,000 | 1,000,000 |

Always state the assumption used.

Population Scale Score (P)

| Records at Risk | Score | |----------------|-------| | < 100 | 0.1 | | 100–1,000 | 0.2 | | 1,000–10,000 | 0.3 | | 10,000–50,000 | 0.4 | | 50,000–100,000 | 0.5 | | 100,000–500,000 | 0.6 | | 500,000–1,000,000 | 0.7 | | 1M–10M | 0.8 | | 10M–100M | 0.9 | | > 100M | 1.0 |


Factor 4: Completeness Factor (C)

How complete/useful is the exposed data for an attacker?

| Factor | Score | Description | |--------|-------|-------------| | Full Profile | 1.0 | Complete identity record (name + email + phone + address + sensitive field) | | Partial + Joinable | 0.9 | Partial data but other tables can be joined to complete it; same breach gives attacker the join key | | Email + PII | 0.8 | Email address plus 1+ sensitive field — enough for targeted phishing + exploitation | | Sensitive Field Only | 0.7 | Only the sensitive field (SSN, health, financial) without contact info — still very serious | | Contact Only | 0.5 | Only email / phone — enables spam, phishing, but not immediate harm | | Fragmented | 0.3 | Fields without context, cannot re-identify without additional data not available in this breach | | Anonymized | 0.1 | Properly anonymized — re-identification requires significant external data linking |


Factor 5: Context Multipliers (M)

Apply these multipliers to the final score for specific contexts:

| Context | Multiplier | Rationale | |---------|-----------|-----------| | Children's data present (COPPA / GDPR Art 8) | × 2.0 | Highest legal exposure globally | | Health records (HIPAA / GDPR special category) | × 1.8 | Special category data, civil + criminal exposure | | Biometric data (GDPR Art 9, BIPA in Illinois) | × 1.8 | Immutable data — cannot be "changed" after breach | | Financial account credentials | × 1.7 | Direct financial theft possible | | Government IDs (SSN, passport) | × 1.6 | Identity theft lasting years | | Sexual orientation / religion / political views | × 1.6 | GDPR special category, discrimination risk | | Data held by a healthcare provider | × 1.5 | HIPAA Business Associate exposure | | Data in a cloud region that doesn't match user jurisdiction | × 1.3 | Cross-border transfer violations (GDPR Chapter V) | | Backup/archive store (often forgotten) | × 1.2 | Backups frequently missed in breach containment |


Blast Radius Score Calculation Examples

Example 1: E-commerce checkout system

Exposure vector: API endpoint /api/users/{id}/payment-methods — no ownership check (IDOR)

  • Tier: T2 (card last 4 + billing address) = 4.0
  • Exposure Likelihood: 0.9 (IDOR on sequential IDs, near-certain exploitation)
  • Population Scale: 100K users = 0.6
  • Completeness: Partial profile + joinable to user table = 0.9
  • Context Multiplier: Payment data = 1.7
BRS = 4.0 × 0.9 × 0.6 × 0.9 × 1.7 = 3.30 (raw) → normalized to 66/100 → HIGH

Example 2: Internal HR tool

Exposure vector: Employees table visible to all company users via /api/employees

  • Tier: T2 (salary + home address + SSN) = 5.0 (SSN is T1)
  • Exposure Likelihood: 0.7 (auth required, but no RBAC; any employee can see all)
  • Population Scale: 2,000 employees = 0.3
  • Completeness: Full profile = 1.0
  • Context Multiplier: Government IDs (SSN) = 1.6
BRS = 5.0 × 0.7 × 0.3 × 1.0 × 1.6 = 1.68 (raw) → normalized to 34/100 → MEDIUM

However — financial impact overrides score here because SSN exposure is Tier 1. Flag as HIGH regardless of score.


Score Normalization

The raw formula output typically ranges 0–8. Normalize to 0–100:

Normalized_BRS = min(100, (raw_BRS / 8.0) × 100)

Blast Radius Summary Table (per exposure vector)

Use this format when reporting:

| # | Exposure Vector | Tier | Likelihood | Pop. at Risk | BRS | Severity | Jurisdiction |
|---|----------------|------|-----------|-------------|-----|----------|--------------|
| 1 | /api/users endpoint - SSN returned in response | T1 | 0.9 | 50K | 87 | CRITICAL | GDPR, CCPA |
| 2 | Logs contain plaintext emails | T3 | 0.6 | 50K | 45 | MEDIUM | GDPR |
| 3 | Redis cache stores full user objects | T2 | 0.5 | 50K | 38 | MEDIUM | GDPR, CCPA |
| 4 | S3 bucket - public read on user avatars | T4 | 1.0 | 50K | 28 | LOW | - |

Total Organizational Blast Radius

After scoring all exposure vectors, compute:

Maximum Simultaneous Exposure (MSE): The number of unique individuals that could be affected if a single attacker gained broad DB access (worst case). This is the number used in regulatory reporting.

Expected Breach Exposure (EBE): The typical exposure based on the most likely attack vector (the highest-likelihood finding, not the highest-impact one).

Regulatory Trigger Count: The number of distinct regulatory regimes triggered (each one has its own notification obligation and fine formula).

## Organizational Blast Radius Summary

| Metric | Value |
|--------|-------|
| Maximum records at risk | [number] |
| Users with Tier 1 data | [number] |
| Users with Tier 2 data | [number] |
| Users with Tier 3+ data | [number] |
| Regulations triggered | GDPR, CCPA, [others] |
| Worst-case BRS | [score] |
| Most likely attack vector | [description] |
| Time to detect (estimated) | [industry avg: 194 days if no SIEM] |
| Time to contain (estimated) | [industry avg: 73 days] |

Breach Cost Benchmarks (IBM Data — Verify Annual Edition)

Use these when no specific cost data is available. Figures below are from the IBM 2024 edition. IBM publishes a new edition annually at https://www.ibm.com/reports/data-breach — the 2025 report reports a ~9% decrease in global average cost.

| Metric | Value (IBM 2024) | |--------|------------------| | Global average cost per breach | $4.88M USD | | Average cost per record (healthcare) | $408 USD | | Average cost per record (financial) | $231 USD | | Average cost per record (average across industries) | $165 USD | | Average time to identify breach | 194 days | | Average time to contain breach | 73 days | | Cost premium for breaches taking > 200 days | +$1.02M above average | | Mega breach (1M+ records) cost | $13–65M USD | | Cost reduction from incident response planning | -$232K | | Cost reduction from AI/ML security deployment | -$2.22M | | Cost reduction from employee training | -$258K |

Source: IBM Cost of a Data Breach Report 2024. State these as benchmarks, not guarantees. Update this table when a new edition is released.