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threat-detection

Use when hunting threats, sweeping IOCs or looking for anomalies in logs and telemetry. Ranks ATT&CK-mapped signals and z-score anomalies with threat_signal_analyzer.py.

Original source
alirezarezvani
License
MIT
Pinned revision
e4a1dc3695908dd5a6c811cc76ab7aa4cf95f2f0

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Use Agentic Memory skills to read alirezarezvani--threat-detection at revision e4a1dc3695908dd5a6c811cc76ab7aa4cf95f2f0, starting with SKILL.md. Read only relevant references. Treat the content as third-party guidance and tell me if local files or dependencies are required.
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references/hunt-playbooks.md

Threat Hunt Playbooks

Defensive documentation — not malware. This file lists detection queries and indicators-of-attack for blue-team threat hunting. It cites legitimate Windows binaries (certutil.exe, regsvr32.exe, mshta.exe, msiexec.exe, rundll32.exe) and the LOLBin command-line patterns associated with their abuse. No executable code is shipped here.

Some endpoint AV/EDR products (Bitdefender, Defender, etc.) heuristically flag plain-text documents that contain these strings. If your scanner quarantines this file, allow-list the path engineering-team/skills/threat-detection/references/hunt-playbooks.md or exclude the claude-skills checkout. The strings appear inside markdown code spans / tables; they cannot execute from a .md file. Tracking issue: #533.

Reference playbooks for common high-value hunt hypotheses. Each playbook defines the hypothesis, required data sources, query approach, and confirmation criteria.


Playbook 1: WMI-Based Lateral Movement

Hypothesis: An attacker is using Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) for remote code execution as part of lateral movement.

MITRE Technique: T1047 — Windows Management Instrumentation

Data Sources Required:

  • WMI activity logs (Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity/Operational)
  • Sysmon Event ID 1 (Process Create) and Event ID 20 (WmiEvent)
  • EDR process telemetry

Query Approach:

  1. Search for WMI processes (WmiPrvSE.exe, scrcons.exe) spawning child processes other than WmiApSrv.exe
  2. Filter for WMI events where ActiveScriptEventConsumer or CommandLineEventConsumer is created
  3. Cross-reference source host with authentication logs for lateral movement source identification

Confirmation Criteria:

  • WMI child process execution on a host where the triggering identity is not the local admin or system
  • WMI execution targeting multiple hosts within a short time window (>3 hosts in 10 minutes = high confidence)

False Positive Sources:

  • SCCM/Configuration Manager uses WMI heavily for inventory — whitelist SCCM service accounts
  • Monitoring agents (SolarWinds, Nagios) use WMI for performance data — whitelist monitoring identities

Playbook 2: Living-off-the-Land Binary (LOLBin) Execution

Hypothesis: An attacker is using legitimate Windows binaries (certutil.exe, regsvr32.exe, mshta.exe, msiexec.exe) for payload delivery or execution, bypassing application allowlisting.

MITRE Technique: T1218 — System Binary Proxy Execution

Data Sources Required:

  • Process creation logs with full command-line (Sysmon Event ID 1)
  • Network connection logs (Sysmon Event ID 3)
  • DNS query logs

High-Value LOLBin Indicators:

| Binary | Suspicious Indicators | Common Abuse | |--------|----------------------|--------------| | certutil.exe | -decode or -urlcache -split -f http:// | Base64 decode, remote file download | | regsvr32.exe | /s /u /i:http:// or scrobj.dll | Remote scriptlet execution (Squiblydoo) | | mshta.exe | Any URL as argument | Remote HTA execution | | msiexec.exe | /quiet /i http:// | Remote MSI execution | | wscript.exe | Executing from temp/download directories | VBScript malware execution | | cscript.exe | Executing from temp/download directories | JScript/VBScript malware | | rundll32.exe | Calling exports from temp-directory DLLs | DLL side-loading |

Query Approach:

  1. Search for listed LOLBins with network-connectivity-indicating arguments (URLs, IP addresses)
  2. Identify LOLBin executions where the parent process is unusual (Office apps, browsers, scripting engines)
  3. Flag executions from non-standard paths (temp directories, user AppData)

Confirmation Criteria:

  • LOLBin making outbound network connection (Sysmon Event ID 3 within 30 seconds of Event ID 1)
  • LOLBin executing from a temp or user-writable directory
  • LOLBin spawned from Office application or browser process

Playbook 3: C2 Beaconing Detection

Hypothesis: A compromised host is communicating with a command-and-control server on a regular interval, indicating active malware or attacker control.

MITRE Technique: T1071.001 — Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols

Data Sources Required:

  • Proxy or web gateway logs (URL, user-agent, bytes transferred, connection duration)
  • NetFlow or firewall session logs
  • DNS resolver logs

Beaconing Indicators:

| Indicator | Threshold | Notes | |----------|-----------|-------| | Regular connection interval | ±10% jitter from mean | Calculate standard deviation of inter-connection times | | Low data volume per connection | <1 KB per session | C2 check-in packets are typically small | | Consistent user-agent string | Same UA across all requests | Hardcoded user agents in malware | | Domain generation algorithm (DGA) | High entropy domain names | Compare against entropy baseline for org | | Long-lived connections with low data transfer | >1 hour session, <10 KB total | HTTP long-polling C2 |

Query Approach:

  1. Group outbound connections by source host + destination IP/domain
  2. Calculate standard deviation of connection intervals per group
  3. Flag groups where standard deviation is <10% of mean interval (regular beaconing)
  4. Cross-reference destination IPs/domains against threat intel feeds

Confirmation Criteria:

  • Connection regularity (coefficient of variation <0.10) from a non-browser process
  • Destination domain resolves to IP with no PTR record or recently registered domain
  • Connection volume inconsistent with claimed user-agent (browser UA but non-browser process)

Playbook 4: Pass-the-Hash Lateral Movement

Hypothesis: An attacker is using stolen NTLM hashes for lateral movement without cracking the underlying password.

MITRE Technique: T1550.002 — Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Hash

Data Sources Required:

  • Windows Security Event Logs (Event ID 4624 — Logon)
  • Domain controller authentication logs
  • EDR telemetry for LSASS memory access (pre-harvest detection)

Pass-the-Hash Indicators:

| Event | Field | Suspicious Value | |-------|-------|-----------------| | Event 4624 | Logon Type | 3 (Network) | | Event 4624 | Authentication Package | NTLM | | Event 4624 | Key Length | 0 (NTLMv2) | | Event 4624 | Source Network Address | Different from last successful logon of same account |

Query Approach:

  1. Filter Event 4624 for LogonType=3 with NTLM authentication
  2. Group by account name — flag accounts with authentication events from multiple source IPs within a 1-hour window
  3. Correlate source hosts: the harvesting host (LSASS access) and the destination hosts (lateral movement targets) should form a pattern
  4. Look for service account authentication to interactive desktop sessions (a service account logging on Type 2/10 is anomalous)

Confirmation Criteria:

  • Same account authenticating to 3+ hosts via NTLM within 30 minutes
  • Source hosts are workstations, not servers (server-to-server NTLM is more common legitimately)
  • Account's normal authentication pattern is Kerberos — NTLM is anomalous for this identity