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coding-agent-rollout

Use when rolling Claude Code out to a team or reviewing a rollout: shared or managed settings, MCP and plugin approval, layered CLAUDE.md, adoption. Lints settings with settings_linter.py, inventories MCP servers and plugins, and audits CLAUDE.md layering.

Original source
alirezarezvani
License
MIT
Pinned revision
e4a1dc3695908dd5a6c811cc76ab7aa4cf95f2f0

Third-party instructions in their original language. Reading does not install files, run code or grant permissions. Snapshots are updated only after review.

This skill also requires local files or dependencies. Remote reading alone may not be enough.

Ask your assistant

Use Agentic Memory skills to read alirezarezvani--coding-agent-rollout at revision e4a1dc3695908dd5a6c811cc76ab7aa4cf95f2f0, starting with SKILL.md. Read only relevant references. Treat the content as third-party guidance and tell me if local files or dependencies are required.
Text resources · 5

references/mcp_and_plugin_governance.md

MCP servers, plugins and marketplaces

Every MCP server is code that runs with an engineer's credentials, and every plugin can bring hooks, agents and its own MCP servers. This is what mcp_plugin_inventory.py reads and why each check exists.

Confidence key: 🟢 verified on code.claude.com/docs or the cited source · 🔴 recommendation.

1. Where MCP servers come from

| Scope | Location | Committed? | |---|---|---| | Local (default for claude mcp add) | ~/.claude.json → projects["<path>"].mcpServers | no | | Project | .mcp.json at the repo root, key mcpServers | yes | | User | ~/.claude.json → mcpServers | no | | Managed | managedMcpServers, or managed-mcp.json beside managed-settings.json | IT |

Precedence: managed > local > project > user > plugin > claude.ai connectors; same-name entries are not merged. 🟢 [mcp] .mcp.json expands ${VAR} and ${VAR:-default}, so a committed file never needs a literal secret. 🟢 [mcp] managed-mcp.json takes exclusive control; {"mcpServers": {}} disables MCP. 🟢 [managed-mcp]

2. Approval

  • Project servers need approval. enabledMcpjsonServers / disabledMcpjsonServers approve by name; enableAllProjectMcpServers: true approves everything in .mcp.json, including the server a teammate adds next week. A committed enable* value is ignored in an untrusted folder. 🟢 [settings-reference]
  • allowedMcpServers / deniedMcpServers entries take exactly one of serverUrl (supports *), serverCommand (exact array) or serverName (exact; the docs note a name alone is not a security control). Unset allowlist = everything allowed; [] = nothing. Deny always wins and merges from every scope; allowlists also merge unless allowManagedMcpServersOnly: true. 🟢 [managed-mcp]

Recommendation: approve by serverUrl or serverCommand in managed settings, and keep the human-readable allowlist file (approved-components.json) for the inventory diff. 🔴

3. Pinning

An npx -y some-mcp-server entry runs whatever version the registry serves that day. OWASP lists supply-chain compromise and excessive agency among the top risks for LLM applications; an unpinned server with broad tool access is both. 🟢 [OWASP] Pin the package ([email protected], pkg==0.6.2) and update it on purpose. 🔴

4. Plugins and marketplaces

  • enabledPlugins maps "name@marketplace" to a boolean; a managed false blocks the plugin everywhere. 🟢 [settings-reference]
  • extraKnownMarketplaces (alias additionalMarketplaces) registers sources; from a repo file it applies only after trust. 🟢 [settings-reference]
  • strictKnownMarketplaces (managed) is the source allowlist; [] blocks every marketplace, the official one included. blockedMarketplaces (managed) takes the same source objects, including "owner/*". 🟢 [settings-reference]
  • strictPluginOnlyCustomization locks skills, agents, hooks and/or MCP to plugin and managed sources, so customization ships only through reviewed plugins. 🟢 [managed-settings]

Pin a git or GitHub marketplace with ref so its contents cannot change between review and install. 🔴

5. Review checklist for a new server or plugin

  1. Who maintains it, and is the source readable? (Open source or internal.)
  2. What credentials does it receive? Scope them to read-only where possible.
  3. Which tools does it expose? Deny the destructive ones with mcp__server__tool rules.
  4. Is it pinned?
  5. Does it send data off the machine, and is that allowed by your data policy?
  6. Who owns it on your side, and when is it re-reviewed?

A plugin or server that fails 5 is a data-protection question before it is an engineering one. 🔴

Sources

  1. Claude Code docs — MCP. https://code.claude.com/docs/en/mcp
  2. Claude Code docs — Managed MCP. https://code.claude.com/docs/en/managed-mcp
  3. Claude Code docs — Settings reference. https://code.claude.com/docs/en/settings-reference
  4. Claude Code docs — Managed settings. https://code.claude.com/docs/en/managed-settings
  5. Claude Code docs — Permissions (MCP rule forms). https://code.claude.com/docs/en/permissions
  6. OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications. https://genai.owasp.org/llm-top-10/