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threat-model-analyst

Full STRIDE-A threat model analysis and incremental update skill for repositories and systems. Supports two modes: (1) Single analysis — full STRIDE-A threat model of a repository, producing architecture overviews, DFD diagrams, STRIDE-A analysis, prioritized findings, and executive assessments. (2) Incremental analysis — takes a previous threat model report as baseline, compares the codebase at the latest (or a given commit), and produces an updated report with change tracking (new, resolved, still-present threats), STRIDE heatmap, findings diff, and an embedded HTML comparison. Only activate when the user explicitly requests a threat model analysis, incremental update, or invokes /threat-model-analyst directly.

Original source
github
License
MIT
Pinned revision
5269f7ea2d6c3a9bfda5ed878b6726cf509121fd

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Use Agentic Memory skills to read github--threat-model-analyst at revision 5269f7ea2d6c3a9bfda5ed878b6726cf509121fd, starting with SKILL.md. Read only relevant references. Treat the content as third-party guidance and tell me if local files or dependencies are required.
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references/output-formats.md · 24000

T02.I | — | 🔄 Mitigated by Platform (Azure AD) |


Every threat from `2-stride-analysis.md` must appear in this table. Status is one of:
- `✅ Covered (FIND-XX)` — finding documents a vulnerability that needs remediation
- `✅ Mitigated (FIND-XX)` — finding documents an existing control the team built (gives credit for security work done)
- `🔄 Mitigated by Platform` — external system handles it (only for genuinely external platforms)

**⛔ THIS TABLE IS A FEEDBACK LOOP, NOT DOCUMENTATION:**
The purpose of this table is to force you to check your work. After filling it out:
1. If ANY threat has a `—` dash in the Finding ID column with status other than `🔄 Mitigated by Platform` → **you missed a finding. Go back and create one.**
2. If Platform count > 20% of total threats → **you are overusing Platform as an escape hatch. Re-examine.**
3. If any threat is listed as `⚠️ Accepted Risk` or `⚠️ Needs Review` → **VIOLATION. Create a finding or verify it's genuinely Platform.**

The table should drive you to 100% coverage: every threat maps to either a finding (`✅ Covered`) or a legitimate external platform mitigation (`🔄 Mitigated by Platform`). There is no third option.

**⛔ FINDING GENERATION RULE:**
If a threat in `2-stride-analysis.md` has a non-empty `Mitigation` column, it MUST become a finding. The mitigation text provides the remediation — use it. The only exception is threats genuinely mitigated by an EXTERNAL platform (Azure AD, K8s RBAC, TPM hardware) that this code cannot disable.

---

## 0-assessment.md

**Purpose:** Executive summary, risk rating, action plan, and metadata. The "front page" of the report.

> **⛔ IMPORTANT: Before writing this file, read [skeleton-assessment.md](./skeletons/skeleton-assessment.md) and copy the skeleton VERBATIM. Fill in the `[FILL]` placeholders. This prevents template drift.**

### Section Order (MANDATORY — ALL 7 sections REQUIRED, do NOT skip any)

1. **Report Files** (REQUIRED) — Links to all report deliverables
2. **Executive Summary** (REQUIRED) — Risk rating + coverage. NO separate "Key Recommendations" subsection
3. **Action Summary** (REQUIRED) — Tier-based prioritized action plan with `### Quick Wins` subsection
4. **Analysis Context & Assumptions** (REQUIRED) — Scope, infrastructure context, `### Needs Verification` table, finding overrides
5. **References Consulted** (REQUIRED) — Security standards + component documentation
6. **Report Metadata** (REQUIRED) — Model, timestamps, duration, git info
7. **Classification Reference** (REQUIRED) — MUST be the last section. Static table copied from skeleton.

⚠️ **Enforcement:** If a section has no data, include it with empty tables or "N/A" notes — NEVER omit the section entirely. The agent in previous iterations skipped sections 1, 4, 5, and 6 entirely. ALL SEVEN must be present.

### Report Files Template

The Report Files table MUST list `0-assessment.md` (this file) as the FIRST row, followed by the other files:

```markdown
## Report Files

| File | Description |
|------|-------------|
| [0-assessment.md](0-assessment.md) | This document — executive summary, risk rating, action plan, metadata |
| [0.1-architecture.md](0.1-architecture.md) | Architecture overview, components, scenarios, tech stack |
| [1-threatmodel.md](1-threatmodel.md) | Threat model DFD diagram with element, flow, and boundary tables |
| [1.1-threatmodel.mmd](1.1-threatmodel.mmd) | Pure Mermaid DFD source file |
| [1.2-threatmodel-summary.mmd](1.2-threatmodel-summary.mmd) | Summary DFD (only if generated) |
| [2-stride-analysis.md](2-stride-analysis.md) | Full STRIDE-A analysis for all components |
| [3-findings.md](3-findings.md) | Prioritized security findings with remediation |

⚠️ 0-assessment.md MUST be the first row. The model consistently lists 0.1-architecture.md first — that is WRONG. This file IS the front page of the report and lists itself first.

Risk Rating

The heading must be plain text with NO emojis: ### Risk Rating: Elevated, NOT ### Risk Rating: 🟠 Elevated

Threat Count Context Paragraph

Include at end of Executive Summary:

> **Note on threat counts:** This analysis identified [N] threats across [M] components. This count reflects comprehensive STRIDE-A coverage, not systemic insecurity. Of these, **[T1 count] are directly exploitable** without prerequisites (Tier 1). The remaining [T2+T3 count] represent conditional risks and defense-in-depth considerations.

Action Summary Template

⛔ FIXED PRIORITY MAPPING — The Priority column values are DETERMINISTIC, not judgment-based: | Tier | Priority | Always | |------|----------|--------| | Tier 1 | 🔴 Critical Risk | ALWAYS — regardless of threat/finding count | | Tier 2 | 🟠 Elevated Risk | ALWAYS — regardless of threat/finding count | | Tier 3 | 🟡 Moderate Risk | ALWAYS — regardless of threat/finding count |

NEVER change the priority based on how many threats or findings exist in that tier. Even if Tier 1 has 0 threats and 0 findings, the priority is still 🔴 Critical Risk — because IF a Tier 1 threat existed, it would be critical. The priority reflects the tier's inherent severity, not the count. A report with Tier 1 = "🟢 Low Risk" is WRONG and must be fixed.

## Action Summary

| Tier | Description | Threats | Findings | Priority |
|------|-------------|---------|----------|----------|
| Tier 1 | Directly exploitable | 5 | 3 | 🔴 Critical Risk |
| Tier 2 | Requires authenticated access | 8 | 4 | 🟠 Elevated Risk |
| Tier 3 | Requires prior compromise | 12 | 5 | 🟡 Moderate Risk |
| **Total** | | **25** | **12** | |

⛔ EXACTLY 4 ROWS: The Action Summary table MUST have exactly 4 data rows: Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3, and Total. Do NOT add rows for "Mitigated", "Platform", "Fixed", "Accepted", or any other status. Mitigated threats are distributed across their respective tiers — they are NOT a separate tier. If you find yourself adding a "Mitigated" row, STOP and remove it.


### Quick Wins
<!-- Tier 1 findings with Low remediation effort — high impact, quick fixes -->
| Finding | Title | Why Quick |
|---------|-------|-----------|
| FIND-XX | [title] | [reason] |

⚠️ Quick Wins is a REQUIRED subsection. The ### Quick Wins heading and table MUST appear after the tier summary table inside Action Summary. If no low-effort findings exist, write: ### Quick Wins\n\nNo low-effort findings identified. All findings require Medium or High effort.

Processing Rules for Action Summary:

  1. Populate the tier table with actual counts from 3-findings.md (findings per tier) and 2-stride-analysis.md (threats per tier from T1/T2/T3 columns in summary table)
  2. Quick Wins lists only Tier 1 findings with Remediation Effort: Low — highest-impact, lowest-effort items
  3. If no Tier 1 Low-effort findings exist, show Tier 2 Low-effort findings instead, with a note: "No Tier 1 quick wins identified. These Tier 2 items offer the best effort-to-impact ratio:"
  4. If no Low-effort findings exist at all, keep ### Quick Wins heading and add: No low-effort findings identified. All findings require Medium or High effort.
  5. Verify: Findings column sums must equal total findings count in 3-findings.md
  6. Verify: Threats column sums must equal total threats count in 2-stride-analysis.md summary table

⛔ PROHIBITED Content in Action Summary and All Output Files

NEVER generate ANY of the following:

  • ### Priority Remediation by Phase or any phase-based remediation roadmap
  • Sprint references (Sprint 1-2, Sprint 3-4, etc.)
  • Time-based phases (Phase 1 — Immediate, Phase 2 — Short-term, Phase 3 — Medium-term, Phase 4 — Long-term, Backlog)
  • Time-to-fix estimates (~1 hour, ~2 hours, ~4 hours, 1-2 days, etc.)
  • Timeline or scheduling language (immediately, next quarter, within 30 days, addressed within)
  • Effort duration labels ((hours), (days), (weeks)) after Low/Medium/High effort levels

The report identifies WHAT to fix and WHY (tier + severity + effort level). It does NOT prescribe WHEN to fix it. Scheduling is the team's responsibility. Only use Low, Medium, High for remediation effort — never attach time durations.

Analysis Context & Assumptions Template

⚠️ This ENTIRE section is REQUIRED. Previous iterations skipped it entirely. Include ALL sub-sections below, even if tables are empty.

## Analysis Context & Assumptions

### Analysis Scope
| Constraint | Description |
|------------|-------------|
| Scope | [Full repo or specific area] |
| Excluded | [What was excluded] |
| Focus Areas | [Special focus if any] |

### Infrastructure Context
| Category | Discovered from Codebase | Findings Affected |
|----------|--------------------------|-------------------|

**Every entry in "Discovered from Codebase" MUST include a relative link to the source file or document from which the information was inferred.** Example:

```
| Deployment Model | Air-gapped, single-admin workstation ([daemon.json](src/Container/Moby/daemon.json), [InstallAzureEdgeDiagnosticTool.ps1](src/Setup/InstallArtifacts/InstallAzureEdgeDiagnosticTool.ps1)) | All findings — no Tier 1 |
| Network Exposure | All services bind to localhost:80 only ([KustoContainerHelper.psm1](src/Container/Kusto/KustoContainerHelper.psm1)) | FIND-01, FIND-03 |
```

### Needs Verification
| Item | Question | What to Check | Why Uncertain |
|------|----------|---------------|---------------|

### Finding Overrides
| Finding ID | Original Severity | Override | Justification | New Status |
|------------|-------------------|----------|---------------|------------|
| — | — | — | No overrides applied. Update this section after review. | — |

### Additional Notes
<!-- Any other context from the user's prompt -->

[Freeform notes provided by user]

References Consulted Template

⛔ CRITICAL: This section MUST have TWO subsections with THREE-column tables including full URLs. Do NOT flatten into a simple 2-column | Reference | Usage | table. The model ALWAYS tries to simplify this — do NOT simplify it.

## References Consulted

### Security Standards
| Standard | URL | How Used |
|----------|-----|----------|
| Microsoft SDL Bug Bar | https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/msrc/sdlbugbar | Severity classification |
| OWASP Top 10:2025 | https://owasp.org/Top10/2025/ | Threat categorization |
| CVSS 4.0 | https://www.first.org/cvss/v4.0/specification-document | Risk scoring |
| CWE | https://cwe.mitre.org/ | Weakness classification |
| STRIDE | https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security/develop/threat-modeling-tool-threats | Threat enumeration methodology |
| NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 | https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800-53/r5/upd1/final | Control mapping |

### Component Documentation
| Component | Documentation URL | Relevant Section |
|-----------|------------------|------------------|
| [e.g., Dapr] | [e.g., https://docs.dapr.io/operations/security/] | [e.g., mTLS configuration] |
| [e.g., Redis] | [e.g., https://redis.io/docs/management/security/] | [e.g., Authentication] |

Processing Rules:

  1. Always include the Security Standards table — populate with actual standards consulted
  2. Every row MUST have a full URL (https://...) — never omit the URL column
  3. Populate Component Documentation with technologies actually consulted during analysis
  4. Do not add documentation that was not used

Report Metadata Template

⛔ CRITICAL: ALL fields below are MANDATORY. Do NOT skip Model, Analysis Started, Analysis Completed, or Duration. The previous run omitted these — that is a critical failure. Run Get-Date at start and end to compute Duration.

## Report Metadata

| Field | Value |
|-------|-------|
| Source Location | `[Full path]` |
| Git Repository | `[Remote URL or "Unavailable"]` |
| Git Branch | `[Branch name or "Unavailable"]` |
| Git Commit | `[Short SHA]` (`[YYYY-MM-DD]` — run `git log -1 --format="%cs" [SHA]` to get commit date) |
| Model | `[Model name — ask the system or state the model you are running as]` |
| Machine Name | `[hostname]` |
| Analysis Started | `[UTC timestamp from command]` |
| Analysis Completed | `[UTC timestamp from command]` |
| Duration | `[Computed difference between started and completed]` |
| Output Folder | `[folder name]` |
| Prompt | `[The user's prompt text that triggered this analysis]` |

Gathering rules:

  • START_TIME: Run Get-Date -Format "yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss" -AsUTC at workflow Step 1
  • END_TIME: Run again before writing 0-assessment.md
  • Git fields: git remote get-url origin, git branch --show-current, git rev-parse --short HEAD
  • If any command fails → "Unavailable"
  • NEVER estimate timestamps from folder names
  • Model: State the model you are currently running as (e.g., Claude Opus 4.6, GPT-5.3 Codex, Gemini 3 Pro)
  • Machine: run hostname

Coverage Counts Consistency

Before writing 0-assessment.md:

  • Count elements from 1-threatmodel.md Element Table
  • Count findings from 3-findings.md
  • Count threats from 2-stride-analysis.md summary table
  • Use these exact numbers in Executive Summary and Action Summary

Formatting Rules

  1. --- horizontal rules between every ## section
  2. Report Metadata values all wrapped in backticks
  3. Finding Overrides always uses table format (even when empty)
  4. Report Files section always first
  5. 0.1-architecture.md always listed in Report Files table

Common Mistakes Checklist

These are the most observed deviations. Check after writing each file:

  1. ❌ Organizing by severity → ✅ Organize by Exploitability Tier
  2. ❌ Flat STRIDE tables → ✅ Split into Tier 1/2/3 sub-sections per component
  3. ❌ Missing Exploitability Tier and Remediation Effort → ✅ MANDATORY on every finding
  4. ❌ STRIDE summary missing T1/T2/T3 columns → ✅ Include T1|T2|T3 columns
  5. ❌ Wrapping .md in ```markdown code fences → ✅ Start with # Heading on line 1. The create_file tool writes raw content — fences become literal text in the file.
  6. ❌ Wrapping .mmd in ```plaintext or ```mermaid → ✅ Start with %%{init: on line 1. The .mmd file is raw Mermaid source.
  7. ❌ Missing Action Summary → ✅ Section MUST be titled exactly ## Action Summary. MUST include ### Quick Wins subsection with table of Tier 1 low-effort findings.
  8. ❌ Missing threat count context paragraph → ✅ Include > **Note on threat counts:** blockquote in Executive Summary
  9. ❌ Omitting empty tier sections → ✅ Always include all three tiers per component
  10. ❌ Adding separate ### Key Recommendations or ### Top Recommendations or ### Priority Remediation Roadmap → ✅ Action Summary IS the recommendations — no other name.
  11. ❌ Drawing sidecars as separate nodes → ✅ See diagram-conventions.md Rule 1
  12. ❌ Missing CVSS 4.0 vector string → ✅ Every finding MUST have both score AND full vector (e.g., CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/...)
  13. ❌ Missing CWE or OWASP on findings → ✅ MANDATORY on every finding
  14. ❌ Using OWASP :2021 suffix → ✅ ALWAYS use :2025 (e.g., A01:2025 – Broken Access Control). The 2025 edition is current.
  15. ❌ Missing Threat Coverage Verification table → ✅ Required at end of 3-findings.md
  16. ❌ Architecture component not in STRIDE analysis → ✅ Every component in 0.1-architecture.md must have a STRIDE section
  17. ❌ Missing sequence diagrams for top scenarios → ✅ First 3 scenarios in 0.1-architecture.md MUST have Mermaid sequence diagrams
  18. ❌ Missing Needs Verification section in 0-assessment.md → ✅ Include under Analysis Context & Assumptions
  19. ❌ Missing ## Analysis Context & Assumptions section entirely → ✅ REQUIRED. Previous iterations skipped this section. Must include Scope, Needs Verification, and Finding Overrides sub-tables.
  20. ❌ Missing ### Quick Wins subsection → ✅ REQUIRED under Action Summary. List Tier 1 low-effort findings; if none, include heading with note.
  21. ❌ Skipping ## Report Files, ## References Consulted, or ## Report Metadata → ✅ ALL 7 sections in 0-assessment.md are MANDATORY. Never omit any.
  22. ❌ Finding IDs out of order (FIND-06 before FIND-04) → ✅ Finding IDs MUST be sequential top-to-bottom: FIND-01, FIND-02, FIND-03, ... Renumber after sorting.
  23. ❌ CWE without hyperlink → ✅ CWE MUST include hyperlink: [CWE-306](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/306.html): Missing Authentication for Critical Function
  24. ❌ Time estimates or scheduling in output → ✅ NEVER generate ~1 hour, Sprint 1-2, Phase 1 — Immediate, (hours), or any timeline/duration in ANY output file. The report says WHAT to fix, not WHEN.

threat-inventory.json

Purpose: Structured JSON inventory of all components, data flows, boundaries, threats, and findings. This file enables automated comparison between two threat model runs.

When to generate: Every run (Step 8b). Generated AFTER all markdown files are written.

NOT linked in 0-assessment.md — this is a machine-readable artifact, not a human-readable report file.

Schema

{
  "schema_version": "1.0",
  "commit": "abc1234",
  "commit_date": "2025-08-15",
  "branch": "main",
  "analysis_timestamp": "2025-08-15T14:30:00Z",
  "repository": "https://github.com/org/repo",
  "report_folder": "threat-model-20250815-143000",

  "components": [
    {
      "id": "RedisStateStore",
      "display": "Redis State Store",
      "aliases": ["Redis", "StateStoreRedis"],
      "type": "data_store",
      "tmt_type": "SE.DS.TMCore.NoSQL",
      "boundary": "DataLayer",
      "boundary_kind": "ClusterBoundary",
      "source_files": ["helmchart/myapp/templates/redis-statefulset.yaml"],
      "fingerprint": {
        "component_type": "data_store",
        "boundary_kind": "ClusterBoundary",
        "source_files": ["helmchart/myapp/templates/redis-statefulset.yaml"],
        "source_directories": ["helmchart/myapp/templates/"],
        "class_names": [],
        "namespace": "",
        "api_routes": [],
        "config_keys": ["REDIS_HOST", "REDIS_PORT"],
        "dependencies": [],
        "inbound_from": ["InferencingFlow"],
        "outbound_to": [],
        "protocols": ["TCP"]
      },
      "sidecars": []
    }
  ],

  "boundaries": [
    {
      "id": "DataLayer",
      "display": "Data Layer",
      "aliases": ["Data Boundary", "Persistence Layer"],
      "kind": "ClusterBoundary",
      "contains": ["RedisStateStore", "VectorDB"],
      "contains_fingerprint": "RedisStateStore|VectorDB"
    }
  ],

  "flows": [
    {
      "id": "DF_InferencingFlow_to_Redis",
      "display": "DF25: InferencingFlow → Redis",
      "from": "InferencingFlow",
      "to": "RedisStateStore",
      "protocol": "TCP",
      "label": "State store operations",
      "bidirectional": true,
      "security": {
        "encryption": "none",
        "authentication": "none"
      }
    }
  ],

  "threats": [
    {
      "id": "T05.I",
      "identity_key": {
        "component_id": "RedisStateStore",
        "stride_category": "I",
        "attack_surface": "helmchart/values.yaml:redis.tls.enabled",
        "data_flow_id": "DF_InferencingFlow_to_Redis"
      },
      "title": "Information Disclosure — Redis unencrypted traffic",
      "description": "Redis state store transmits data without TLS...",
      "tier": 1,
      "prerequisites": "None",
      "affected_flow": "DF25",
      "mitigation": "Enable TLS on Redis connections",
      "status": "Open"
    }
  ],

  "findings": [
    {
      "id": "FIND-01",
      "identity_key": {
        "component_id": "RedisStateStore",
        "vulnerability": "CWE-306",
        "attack_surface": "helmchart/values.yaml:redis.auth"
      },
      "title": "Redis state store has no authentication",
      "severity": "Critical",
      "cvss_score": 9.4,
      "cvss_vector": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "cwe": "CWE-306",
      "owasp": "A07:2025",
      "tier": 1,
      "effort": "Low",
      "related_threats": ["T05.I", "T05.T"],
      "evidence_files": ["helmchart/myapp/values.yaml"],
      "component": "Redis State Store"
    }
  ],

  "metrics": {
    "total_components": 15,
    "total_flows": 30,
    "total_boundaries": 7,
    "total_threats": 97,
    "total_findings": 18,
    "threats_by_tier": { "T1": 12, "T2": 53, "T3": 32 },
    "findings_by_tier": { "T1": 7, "T2": 7, "T3": 4 },
    "findings_by_severity": { "Critical": 4, "Important": 8, "Moderate": 6 },
    "threats_by_stride": { "S": 14, "T": 19, "R": 8, "I": 20, "D": 15, "E": 14, "A": 7 }
  }
}

⛔ stride_category MUST be a SINGLE LETTER: S, T, R, I, D, E, or A. NEVER use full names like "Spoofing" or "Denial of Service". The heatmap computation and comparison matching depend on single-letter codes. If you write "stride_category": "Denial of Service" instead of "stride_category": "D", the heatmap will show all zeros for STRIDE columns while tier columns have correct values — this is a critical data integrity bug.

Incremental Analysis Extensions

When generating threat-inventory.json for an incremental analysis (see incremental-orchestrator.md), add these fields:

Top-level fields:

  • "incremental": true — marks this as an incremental report
  • "baseline_report": "threat-model-20260309-174425" — path to baseline report folder
  • "baseline_commit": "2dd84ab" — the commit SHA of the baseline report
  • "target_commit": "abc1234" — the commit being analyzed
  • "schema_version": "1.1" — incremental reports use schema version 1.1

Per-component: "change_status" — one of:

  • "unchanged" — source files identical or cosmetic-only changes
  • "modified" — security-relevant source file changes
  • "restructured" — files moved/renamed, same logical component
  • "removed" — source files deleted
  • "new" — component didn't exist at baseline
  • "merged_into:{id}" — merged into another component
  • "split_into:{id1},{id2}" — split into multiple components

Per-threat: "change_status" — one of:

  • "still_present" — threat exists in current code, same as before
  • "fixed" — vulnerability was remediated (must cite code change)
  • "mitigated" — partial remediation applied
  • "modified" — threat still exists but details changed
  • "new_code" — threat from a genuinely new component
  • "new_in_modified" — threat introduced by code changes in existing component
  • "previously_unidentified" — threat existed in baseline code but wasn't in old report
  • "removed_with_component" — component was removed

Per-finding: "change_status" — same values as per-threat, plus:

  • "partially_mitigated" — code changed partially, vulnerability partially remains

metrics.status_summary — counts per change_status for components, threats, and findings. See incremental-orchestrator.md §4f for the full schema.

Canonical Naming Rules

Component IDs — Derived from actual class/file names, PascalCase:

  • SupportabilityAgent.cs → SupportabilityAgent
  • PowerShellCommandExecutor.cs → PowerShellCommandExecutor
  • "Redis State Store" → RedisStateStore
  • "Ingress-NGINX" → IngressNginx

Flow IDs — Deterministic from endpoints:

  • Format: DF_{Source}_to_{Target}
  • DF_Operator_to_TerminalUI
  • DF_InferencingFlow_to_RedisStateStore

Identity Keys — Each threat and finding gets a canonical identity key:

  • Threats: component_id + stride_category + attack_surface + data_flow_id
  • Findings: component_id + vulnerability (CWE) + attack_surface
  • These keys are independent of LLM-generated prose — they anchor to code artifacts

Deterministic Identity Rules (MANDATORY)

Use these rules so repeated runs on unchanged code produce comparable inventories.

  1. Canonical ID vs display name
  • id is stable identity; display is presentation text
  • Never derive identity from prose wording in findings or diagram labels
  1. Alias capture