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skill-retro

Use when the user wants their skills graded from real session history, asks which installed skills actually work, or wants evidence-backed skill edits. Collects local sessions with collect_sessions.py, scores them against two rubrics and gates edits with score_aggregator.py.

Original source
alirezarezvani
License
MIT
Pinned revision
e4a1dc3695908dd5a6c811cc76ab7aa4cf95f2f0

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Use Agentic Memory skills to read alirezarezvani--skill-retro at revision e4a1dc3695908dd5a6c811cc76ab7aa4cf95f2f0, starting with SKILL.md. Read only relevant references. Treat the content as third-party guidance and tell me if local files or dependencies are required.
Text resources · 6

references/session_mining_privacy.md

Session mining privacy — the local-only contract and the redaction canon

Session transcripts are the most sensitive artifact an agent setup produces: they contain pasted secrets, internal paths, customer data fragments, and the user's own words. skill-retro reads them, so it carries the strictest handling rules in this plugin. This reference explains each rule and where its pattern set comes from.

1. The contract

  1. Read-only sources. Session history (~/.claude/projects/**.jsonl, ~/.codex/sessions/**) is never modified, moved, or re-written — only parsed.
  2. Local-only outputs. Condensed transcripts, inventory, scores, and the report are written to one scratch directory on the user's machine. Nothing is uploaded by any script; the SKILL.md forbids the agent from doing so either. The only shareable artifact is the report the user chooses to share.
  3. Redact before write. Every transcript line passes redact_secrets() before touching disk. There is deliberately no --no-redact flag: an unredacted condensed transcript is a copy of the secret in a second location, which is exactly what secret-hygiene guidance says never to create (source 3).
  4. Restrictive permissions. Output directories are chmod 0700, files 0600 — the process-umask default is world-readable on many systems. This follows the hardening applied to engineering/skillopt-sleep/ in this repo after its adversarial review rounds (source 6).
  5. Data minimization. Transcripts are condensed (message and tool-output budgets, head/tail truncation of long sessions) — collect what scoring needs, not everything available. This is GDPR Art. 5(1)(c)'s principle applied to a local tool: minimum data, single purpose, short-lived scratch storage (source 2).

2. The redaction pattern set

The patterns in collect_sessions.py are a curated subset of the detector sets used by the mainstream secret scanners — gitleaks' default ruleset (source 4), TruffleHog's detector corpus (source 5), and GitHub secret scanning's published provider patterns (source 7):

| Label | Shape | Canonical source | |---|---|---| | private-key | -----BEGIN … PRIVATE KEY----- block | gitleaks private-key | | aws-access-key | AKIA/ASIA + 16 chars | AWS credential format; gitleaks | | github-token | ghp_/gho_/ghu_/ghs_/ghr_, github_pat_ | GitHub token formats (source 7) | | anthropic-key / openai-key | sk-ant-… / sk-… | vendor formats; ordered so the more specific wins | | slack-token | xox[baprs]-… | Slack token format | | stripe-key | sk_live_ / rk_live_ | Stripe key format | | jwt | three base64url segments starting eyJ | RFC 7519 structure | | bearer-token | Bearer <long-token> | RFC 6750 header | | connection-string | scheme://user:pass@host | OWASP secrets guidance (source 3) | | url-credential | ?token=/&api_key=… | GitHub/Azure SAS-style URL secrets | | env-secret | *_API_KEY=, *_SECRET: … value | env-assignment heuristic (keeps the variable name, redacts the value) |

Replacement is [REDACTED:<label>], and the per-label counts land in inventory.json — so the report can honestly say how much was scrubbed, and a sudden spike in redactions is itself a finding about the user's workflow.

Known limits. Pattern-based scanning misses high-entropy secrets with no recognizable shape and free-text PII (names, emails in prose). That is why redaction is a second line, not the first: the first is that transcripts are condensed, stay on the machine, and live in a temp directory the OS reclaims.

3. Why the harness vendors' own guidance matters

Claude Code stores full session transcripts locally per project (source 1); the data is the user's, on the user's disk, and a grading tool inherits that trust boundary. Mining it is legitimate exactly as long as the results stay inside the boundary — the same read-only-harvest posture the SkillOpt sleep engine takes with the identical data source (source 6).

Sources

  1. Anthropic — Claude Code data usage & session-history documentation (code.claude.com/docs; transcripts under ~/.claude/projects/).
  2. GDPR, Art. 5(1)(c) — data minimisation: adequate, relevant, limited to what is necessary for the purpose.
  3. OWASP Secrets Management Cheat Sheet — cheatsheetseries.owasp.org: never duplicate secrets into logs or derived artifacts.
  4. gitleaks — github.com/gitleaks/gitleaks default ruleset (gitleaks.toml): the reference regex corpus for token shapes.
  5. TruffleHog v3 — github.com/trufflesecurity/trufflehog detector corpus: provider-specific secret formats.
  6. This repo — engineering/skillopt-sleep/README.md "Deviations from upstream": redact_secrets() coverage of every persisted artifact plus the 0700/0600 chmod pass; productivity/handoff ships the sibling 17-pattern redaction linter.
  7. GitHub Docs — Secret scanning patterns: published token formats for GitHub and partner providers (ghp_, github_pat_, and the partner list).