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gha-security-review

GitHub Actions security review for workflow exploitation vulnerabilities. Use when asked to "review GitHub Actions", "audit workflows", "check CI security", "GHA security", "workflow security review", or review .github/workflows/ for pwn requests, expression injection, credential theft, and supply chain attacks. Exploitation-focused with concrete PoC scenarios.

Original source
getsentry
License
Apache-2.0
Pinned revision
d12f250460ffd961f549dbebf7eeb0cf4afd4c2e

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Use Agentic Memory skills to read getsentry--gha-security-review at revision d12f250460ffd961f549dbebf7eeb0cf4afd4c2e, starting with SKILL.md. Read only relevant references. Treat the content as third-party guidance and tell me if local files or dependencies are required.
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references/supply-chain.md

Supply Chain: Third-Party Actions

Overview

GitHub Actions workflows depend on third-party actions referenced by uses:. If these actions are not pinned to immutable references (full commit SHAs), attackers can compromise them via tag mutation, account takeover, or fork-and-replace attacks.

Policy: pin third-party actions and reusable workflows to a full 40-character commit SHA. Do not require SHA pins for first-party GitHub actions (actions/*, github/*) on version tags, or for same-repo / vendored actions.


What Counts As Third-Party

| Source | Classification | Pinning finding? | |--------|----------------|------------------| | actions/* (GitHub official) | First-party | No — version tags are fine | | github/* (GitHub org) | First-party | No — version tags are fine | | Same-repo / vendored (./.github/actions/...) | Not third-party supply chain | No as supply-chain pinning (still review in pwn-request context) | | Org-owned / internal first-party actions when reviewing that org's repos | First-party for that org | No unless the action is external to the org's trust boundary | | External orgs (aws-actions, docker, tj-actions, community, unknown) | Third-party | Yes — pin to full SHA when privilege makes it relevant |

When org ownership is unclear, treat non-actions/* / non-github/* / non-local refs as third-party.


Pinning: Tags vs. SHAs

Reportable: Unpinned Third-Party Tags

# REPORT when third-party and the job is privileged enough (see severity)
- uses: some-org/some-action@v1     # Tag — mutable third-party
- uses: tj-actions/changed-files@v44
- uses: docker/build-push-action@v6
- uses: some-org/some-action@main   # Branch — mutable

Tags are mutable Git references. The maintainer (or attacker with write access) can delete and recreate a tag pointing to a different commit. When the tag is updated, every workflow using that tag runs the new code.

Safe: Third-Party SHA Pinning

# SAFE for third-party: commit SHA is immutable
- uses: docker/build-push-action@263435318d21b8e681c14492fe198d362a7d2c83  # v6.18.0
- uses: aws-actions/configure-aws-credentials@e3dd6a429d7300a6a4c196c26e071d42e0343502  # v4.0.2

SHAs are immutable — once a commit exists, its SHA cannot change. Pin third-party actions to the full 40-character SHA and add a comment with the version for readability.

Do Not Report: First-Party Version Tags

# NOT a supply-chain pinning finding
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: actions/setup-node@v4
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
- uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@v3
- uses: ./.github/actions/local-build

First-party actions/* and github/* on version tags are not findings by themselves. Same-repo or vendored actions are not third-party supply-chain findings (they can still be unsafe if loaded from a PR-controlled checkout — that is a pwn-request / trust-crossing issue, not pinning).


Attack Vectors

Tag Mutation Attack

  1. Attacker compromises a popular third-party action's repository (phishing, leaked credentials, insider)
  2. Deletes the v1 tag
  3. Creates a new v1 tag pointing to a malicious commit
  4. Every workflow using @v1 now runs the attacker's code

This is not theoretical — CVE-2025-30066 (tj-actions/changed-files) and related incidents showed tag rewrites can leak secrets at scale.

Account Takeover / Org Compromise

If a third-party action author's GitHub account is compromised:

  • All actions under that account can be backdoored
  • Version tags can be silently updated
  • Users won't notice unless they're pinned to SHAs

Fork-and-Replace

  1. Original action author deletes their repository
  2. Attacker creates a fork with the same owner/repo name
  3. Existing workflows that reference owner/repo@tag now pull from the attacker's fork

Actions That curl | bash at Runtime

Some actions download and execute external scripts at runtime:

# Action's action.yml — RISKY even when SHA-pinned
runs:
  using: composite
  steps:
    - run: curl -sSfL https://example.com/install.sh | bash
      shell: bash

Even if you pin the action to a SHA, the external URL can change. The action itself is immutable, but its runtime dependencies are not. Report this for third-party actions in privileged jobs; do not use it as a reason to demand SHA pins on first-party GitHub actions.


Detection Patterns

# Find third-party action references (exclude first-party + local)
grep -rn "uses:" .github/workflows/ \
  | grep -v "#" \
  | grep -v "uses: \\.\\/" \
  | grep -v "actions/" \
  | grep -v "github/"

# Among third-party refs, find unpinned tags/branches (not full SHA)
grep -rn "uses:" .github/workflows/ \
  | grep -v "#" \
  | grep -v "uses: \\.\\/" \
  | grep -v "actions/" \
  | grep -v "github/" \
  | grep -v "@[0-9a-f]\\{40\\}"

# Find third-party actions pinned to branch names
grep -rn "uses:" .github/workflows/ \
  | grep -v "actions/\\|github/\\|\\./" \
  | grep -E "@(main|master|develop|latest)"

Do not treat every non-SHA uses: as a finding. Filter to third-party first, then assess job privilege.


When To Report

Report mutable third-party actions only when job privilege makes compromise security-relevant.

| Shape | Severity | |-------|----------| | Mutable third-party ref in package publishing, release signing, protected-branch push, production deploy, or token-minting job | High / Critical (unknown org + pull_request_target / secrets → Critical) | | Mutable third-party ref with secrets, OIDC, or non-trivial write-scoped GITHUB_TOKEN | High or Medium depending on blast radius | | Pinned third-party action that downloads and executes mutable remote scripts in a privileged job | Medium, or High when the downloaded payload runs inside the privileged step | | Mutable third-party ref in public read-only CI with no secrets and no write scopes | No finding unless adjacent to another traced workflow risk | | Unpinned first-party actions/* / github/* version tags | No finding | | Local / vendored action pinning | No finding as supply chain (review pwn-request separately) |


Risk Assessment by Third-Party Source

Use this only after the ref is classified third-party and the job is privileged enough to report:

| Source | Risk | Action | |--------|------|--------| | Major orgs (aws-actions, google-github-actions, docker) | Medium | Pin to SHA | | Popular community actions (1k+ stars) | Medium | Pin to SHA, review source | | Less-known actions (under 100 stars) | High | Pin to SHA, review source carefully, consider vendoring | | Unknown / single-maintainer | Critical | Vendor locally or replace with inline run: |


The Fix: SHA Pin Third-Party Actions

steps:
  # First-party: version tags are fine — do not flag
  - uses: actions/checkout@v4
  - uses: actions/setup-node@v4

  # Third-party: pin to SHA, comment with version for readability
  - uses: docker/build-push-action@263435318d21b8e681c14492fe198d362a7d2c83  # v6.18.0
  - uses: aws-actions/configure-aws-credentials@e3dd6a429d7300a6a4c196c26e071d42e0343502  # v4.0.2

Automated Pinning

Tools that can pin and update third-party action SHAs:

  • Dependabot — GitHub native, updates action SHAs
  • Renovate — Can pin and update actions
  • StepSecurity Secure Workflows — Can pin actions to SHAs (configure to match third-party-only policy if you do not want first-party pins)

Vendoring Critical Actions

For high-security workflows, vendor the third-party action locally:

# Instead of: uses: some-org/critical-action@v1
# Copy the action into your repo:
- uses: ./.github/actions/critical-action

Severity Guidelines

| Pattern | Severity | Rationale | |---------|----------|-----------| | Unpinned third-party action from unknown org used in pull_request_target | Critical | Attacker could backdoor the action AND access secrets | | Unpinned third-party action from known org in sensitive/privileged workflow | High | Tag mutation risk with secret exposure | | Unpinned third-party action with limited privilege but real write/secret surface | Medium | Real supply-chain risk, bounded blast radius | | Third-party action that curls external scripts at runtime in a privileged job | High | Even SHA-pinned actions can be compromised via external deps | | Unpinned first-party actions/* / github/* | Do not report | Outside pinning policy | | Local action (./.github/actions/) unpinned | Do not report as pinning | Controlled by repo; only risky in pwn-request context |


Exploitation Scenario Template

ATTACK: Supply Chain via [unpinned third-party action / tag mutation / curl|bash]
ENTRY: Attacker compromises [third-party action repo / account / external URL]
PAYLOAD: Malicious code in [action.yml / downloaded script]
TRIGGER: Workflow [file:line] uses third-party [action@tag] without SHA pin
EXECUTION: Modified action runs with workflow permissions
IMPACT: [RCE with workflow permissions, secret theft, etc.]

References