references/threat-modeling-guide.md
Threat Modeling Guide
Systematic approaches for identifying, analyzing, and mitigating security threats.
Table of Contents
- Threat Modeling Process
- STRIDE Framework
- Attack Trees
- DREAD Risk Scoring
- Data Flow Diagrams
- Common Attack Patterns
Threat Modeling Process
Workflow: Conduct Threat Model
- Define the scope and objectives:
- System boundaries
- Assets to protect
- Trust levels
- Create data flow diagram:
- External entities
- Processes
- Data stores
- Data flows
- Trust boundaries
- Identify threats using STRIDE:
- Apply STRIDE to each DFD element
- Document threat scenarios
- Analyze and prioritize risks:
- Score using DREAD
- Rank by severity
- Define mitigations:
- Map controls to threats
- Identify gaps
- Validate and iterate:
- Review with team
- Update as system evolves
- Document in threat model report
- Validation: All DFD elements analyzed; threats documented; mitigations mapped; residual risks accepted
Threat Model Template
THREAT MODEL REPORT
System: [System Name]
Version: [Version]
Date: [Date]
Author: [Name]
1. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
- Purpose: [Description]
- Users: [User types]
- Data: [Data classification]
2. SCOPE
- In Scope: [Components included]
- Out of Scope: [Components excluded]
- Assumptions: [Security assumptions]
3. DATA FLOW DIAGRAM
[DFD image or ASCII representation]
4. THREATS IDENTIFIED
| ID | Element | STRIDE | Threat | DREAD | Mitigation |
|----|---------|--------|--------|-------|------------|
5. RESIDUAL RISKS
[Accepted risks with justification]
6. RECOMMENDATIONS
[Prioritized security improvements]
STRIDE Framework
Categorization model for identifying threats.
STRIDE Categories
| Category | Description | Violated Property | |----------|-------------|-------------------| | Spoofing | Pretending to be someone/something else | Authentication | | Tampering | Modifying data or code | Integrity | | Repudiation | Denying actions occurred | Non-repudiation | | Information Disclosure | Exposing data to unauthorized parties | Confidentiality | | Denial of Service | Making system unavailable | Availability | | Elevation of Privilege | Gaining unauthorized access | Authorization |
STRIDE per Element
| DFD Element | Applicable Threats | |-------------|-------------------| | External Entity | S, R | | Process | S, T, R, I, D, E | | Data Store | T, R, I, D | | Data Flow | T, I, D |
STRIDE Analysis Template
STRIDE ANALYSIS
Element: User Authentication Service
Type: Process
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ SPOOFING │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Threat: Attacker uses stolen credentials to impersonate user │
│ Attack Vector: Phishing, credential stuffing, session hijack │
│ Likelihood: High │
│ Impact: High - Full account access │
│ Mitigation: MFA, session binding, anomaly detection │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ TAMPERING │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Threat: Attacker modifies authentication request in transit │
│ Attack Vector: Man-in-the-middle, request manipulation │
│ Likelihood: Medium │
│ Impact: High - Bypass authentication │
│ Mitigation: TLS 1.3, request signing, HSTS │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ REPUDIATION │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Threat: User denies performing privileged action │
│ Attack Vector: Claim account was compromised │
│ Likelihood: Medium │
│ Impact: Medium - Dispute resolution difficulty │
│ Mitigation: Comprehensive audit logging, log integrity │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ INFORMATION DISCLOSURE │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Threat: Password hashes exposed via SQL injection │
│ Attack Vector: SQLi, backup exposure, error messages │
│ Likelihood: Medium │
│ Impact: Critical - Mass credential compromise │
│ Mitigation: Parameterized queries, encryption, error handling │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ DENIAL OF SERVICE │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Threat: Brute force attacks overwhelm authentication service │
│ Attack Vector: Credential stuffing, distributed attacks │
│ Likelihood: High │
│ Impact: High - Users cannot authenticate │
│ Mitigation: Rate limiting, CAPTCHA, account lockout │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ ELEVATION OF PRIVILEGE │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Threat: Regular user gains admin privileges │
│ Attack Vector: JWT manipulation, IDOR, role confusion │
│ Likelihood: Medium │
│ Impact: Critical - Full system compromise │
│ Mitigation: Server-side authorization, signed tokens, RBAC │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
Threat Mitigation Matrix
| STRIDE Category | Standard Mitigations | |-----------------|---------------------| | Spoofing | Authentication (passwords, MFA, certificates) | | Tampering | Integrity controls (signing, hashing, checksums) | | Repudiation | Audit logging, digital signatures, timestamps | | Information Disclosure | Encryption, access controls, data masking | | Denial of Service | Rate limiting, redundancy, filtering | | Elevation of Privilege | Authorization, least privilege, input validation |
Attack Trees
Visual representation of attack paths to a specific goal.
Attack Tree Structure
ATTACK TREE: Compromise User Account
┌─────────────────────┐
│ GOAL: Access User │
│ Account │
└──────────┬──────────┘
│
┌───────────────────┼───────────────────┐
│ │ │
┌──────┴──────┐ ┌──────┴──────┐ ┌──────┴──────┐
│ Obtain │ │ Bypass │ │ Exploit │
│ Credentials │ │ Auth │ │ Session │
│ [OR] │ │ [OR] │ │ [OR] │
└──────┬──────┘ └──────┬──────┘ └──────┬──────┘
│ │ │
┌─────┼─────┐ ┌─────┼─────┐ ┌─────┼─────┐
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │
┌─┴─┐ ┌─┴─┐ ┌─┴─┐ ┌─┴─┐ ┌─┴─┐ ┌─┴─┐ ┌─┴─┐ ┌─┴─┐ ┌─┴─┐
│Phi│ │Crd│ │Key│ │SQL│ │JWT│ │Pwd│ │XSS│ │Fix│ │Sid│
│sh │ │Stf│ │Log│ │ i │ │Frg│ │Rst│ │ │ │tn │ │Hj │
└───┘ └───┘ └───┘ └───┘ └───┘ └───┘ └───┘ └───┘ └───┘
Legend:
- Phi: Phishing
- CrdStf: Credential Stuffing
- KeyLog: Keylogger
- SQLi: SQL Injection
- JWTFrg: JWT Forgery
- PwdRst: Password Reset Flaw
- XSS: Cross-Site Scripting
- Fixtn: Session Fixation
- SidHj: Session Hijacking
Attack Tree Analysis
| Attack Path | Difficulty | Detection | Priority | |-------------|------------|-----------|----------| | Phishing → Credential theft | Low | Medium | High | | SQL Injection → Auth bypass | Medium | High | Critical | | XSS → Session steal | Medium | Medium | High | | JWT forgery → Privilege escalation | High | Low | Critical |
Calculating Attack Probability
def calculate_attack_probability(attack_tree_node):
"""
Calculate cumulative probability of attack success.
For OR nodes: P = 1 - (1-P1)(1-P2)...(1-Pn)
For AND nodes: P = P1 * P2 * ... * Pn
"""
if node.is_leaf:
return node.probability
child_probs = [calculate_attack_probability(c) for c in node.children]
if node.operator == 'OR':
# At least one path succeeds
prob_all_fail = 1
for p in child_probs:
prob_all_fail *= (1 - p)
return 1 - prob_all_fail
elif node.operator == 'AND':
# All paths must succeed
prob_all_succeed = 1
for p in child_probs:
prob_all_succeed *= p
return prob_all_succeed
DREAD Risk Scoring
Quantitative risk assessment for prioritizing threats.
DREAD Components
| Factor | Description | Scale | |--------|-------------|-------| | Damage | How bad is the impact? | 1-10 | | Reproducibility | How easy to reproduce? | 1-10 | | Exploitability | How easy to exploit? | 1-10 | | Affected Users | How many users impacted? | 1-10 | | Discoverability | How easy to find? | 1-10 |
DREAD Scoring Guide
Damage Potential: | Score | Description | |-------|-------------| | 10 | Complete system compromise, data destruction | | 7-9 | Large data breach, significant financial loss | | 4-6 | Partial data exposure, service degradation | | 1-3 | Minor information disclosure, low impact |
Reproducibility: | Score | Description | |-------|-------------| | 10 | Always reproducible, automated | | 7-9 | Reproducible most of the time | | 4-6 | Reproducible with some effort | | 1-3 | Difficult to reproduce, timing dependent |
Exploitability: | Score | Description | |-------|-------------| | 10 | No skills required, exploit exists | | 7-9 | Basic skills, tools available | | 4-6 | Moderate skills required | | 1-3 | Advanced skills, custom exploit needed |
Affected Users: | Score | Description | |-------|-------------| | 10 | All users | | 7-9 | Large subset of users | | 4-6 | Some users | | 1-3 | Few or individual users |
Discoverability: | Score | Description | |-------|-------------| | 10 | Publicly documented, obvious | | 7-9 | Easy to find via scanning | | 4-6 | Requires investigation | | 1-3 | Obscure, requires insider knowledge |
DREAD Calculation
def calculate_dread_score(damage, reproducibility, exploitability,
affected_users, discoverability):
"""
Calculate DREAD risk score.
Returns: Float between 1-10
Risk Levels:
8-10: Critical
6-7.9: High
4-5.9: Medium
1-3.9: Low
"""
score = (damage + reproducibility + exploitability +
affected_users + discoverability) / 5
return round(score, 1)
def get_risk_level(dread_score):
if dread_score >= 8:
return 'Critical'
elif dread_score >= 6:
return 'High'
elif dread_score >= 4:
return 'Medium'
else:
return 'Low'
DREAD Assessment Example
THREAT: SQL Injection in Login Form
| Factor | Score | Justification |
|--------|-------|---------------|
| Damage | 9 | Full database access, credential theft |
| Reproducibility | 9 | Consistent, automated tools exist |
| Exploitability | 8 | Well-documented attack, easy tools |
| Affected Users | 10 | All users with accounts |
| Discoverability | 7 | Scanners detect easily |
DREAD Score: (9+9+8+10+7)/5 = 8.6
Risk Level: CRITICAL
Priority: Immediate remediation required
Data Flow Diagrams
Visual representation of system data movement for security analysis.
DFD Elements
| Symbol | Element | Security Considerations | |--------|---------|------------------------| | Rectangle | External Entity | Trust boundary crossing | | Circle/Oval | Process | All STRIDE threats apply | | Parallel Lines | Data Store | Tampering, disclosure, DoS | | Arrow | Data Flow | Tampering, disclosure, DoS | | Dashed Line | Trust Boundary | Authentication required |
DFD Levels
| Level | Description | Use Case | |-------|-------------|----------| | Level 0 (Context) | Single process, external entities | Executive overview | | Level 1 | Major processes expanded | Architecture review | | Level 2 | Detailed subprocesses | Detailed threat modeling |
Example: E-Commerce DFD
LEVEL 0: CONTEXT DIAGRAM
┌──────────────────┐
│ │
┌────────────┐ │ E-Commerce │ ┌────────────┐
│ │ Orders │ System │ Payment │ │
│ Customer │──────────▶│ │──────────▶│ Payment │
│ │◀──────────│ │◀──────────│ Gateway │
└────────────┘ Status │ │ Result └────────────┘
│ │
└──────────────────┘
│
│ Fulfillment
▼
┌────────────────┐
│ Warehouse │
│ System │
└────────────────┘
LEVEL 1: EXPANDED VIEW
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ TRUST BOUNDARY │
│ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - │
│ │
│ ┌─────────┐ ┌─────────┐ ┌─────────┐ ┌─────────┐ │
│ │ │ │ Web │ │ Order │ │ Payment │ │
│ │ CDN │──────▶│ Server │──────▶│ Service │──────▶│ Service │ │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │
│ └─────────┘ └────┬────┘ └────┬────┘ └────┬────┘ │
│ │ │ │ │
│ │ │ │ │
│ ▼ ▼ ▼ │
│ ╔═══════════╗ ╔═══════════╗ ╔═══════════╗ │
│ ║ Session ║ ║ Orders ║ ║ Payment ║ │
│ ║ Store ║ ║ DB ║ ║ DB ║ │
│ ╚═══════════╝ ╚═══════════╝ ╚═══════════╝ │
│ │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
│
│ Crosses Trust Boundary
▼
┌───────────┐
│ Payment │
│ Gateway │
│ (External)│
└───────────┘
Trust Boundary Analysis
| Boundary Crossing | Authentication | Authorization | Encryption | |-------------------|----------------|---------------|------------| | Customer → Web Server | Session cookie | - | TLS 1.3 | | Web Server → Order Service | mTLS | Service account | Internal TLS | | Order Service → DB | Connection pool | DB user roles | TLS | | Payment Service → Gateway | API key + HMAC | IP whitelist | TLS 1.3 |
Common Attack Patterns
OWASP Top 10 Mapping
Codes follow the OWASP Top 10:2025.
| Rank | Vulnerability | STRIDE | Common Attack | |------|---------------|--------|---------------| | A01 | Broken Access Control (incl. SSRF) | E, I | IDOR, privilege escalation, internal service access | | A02 | Security Misconfiguration | I, E | Default creds, verbose errors | | A03 | Software Supply Chain Failures | All | Outdated libraries, CVEs, compromised builds | | A04 | Cryptographic Failures | I | Weak encryption, exposed keys | | A05 | Injection | T, E | SQLi, XSS, command injection | | A06 | Insecure Design | All | Logic flaws, missing controls | | A07 | Authentication Failures | S, E | Credential stuffing, weak passwords | | A08 | Software or Data Integrity Failures | T | Unsigned updates, CI/CD attacks | | A09 | Security Logging and Alerting Failures | R | Missing logs, log injection | | A10 | Mishandling of Exceptional Conditions | D, E | Fail-open checks, error leakage |
Attack Pattern Catalog
ATTACK PATTERN: SQL Injection (A03)
Threat: T (Tampering), E (Elevation of Privilege)
Attack Vector:
1. Identify input fields that construct SQL queries
2. Test for injection: ' OR '1'='1' --
3. Extract data: UNION SELECT password FROM users
4. Escalate: Execute stored procedures, write files
Detection:
- WAF rules for SQL patterns
- Prepared statement verification
- Database query logging
Mitigation:
- Parameterized queries (primary)
- Input validation (secondary)
- Least privilege database accounts
- Web application firewall
Test Cases:
- Single quote injection: '
- Boolean-based: ' OR 1=1 --
- Time-based: '; WAITFOR DELAY '0:0:5' --
- UNION-based: ' UNION SELECT NULL, username, password FROM users --
Threat Intelligence Integration
| Source | Purpose | Update Frequency | |--------|---------|------------------| | CVE/NVD | Known vulnerabilities | Daily | | MITRE ATT&CK | Attack techniques | Quarterly | | OWASP | Web application threats | Annual | | Industry ISACs | Sector-specific threats | Real-time |