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env-secrets-manager

Use when auditing .env files, planning credential rotation, chasing a missing env var in production or hardening a repo against leaked secrets. Scans for committed secrets and drift with env_auditor.py.

Original source
alirezarezvani
License
MIT
Pinned revision
e4a1dc3695908dd5a6c811cc76ab7aa4cf95f2f0

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references/validation-detection-rotation.md

env-secrets-manager reference

Required Variable Validation Script

#!/bin/bash
# scripts/validate-env.sh
# Run at app startup or in CI before deploy
# Exit 1 if any required var is missing or empty

set -euo pipefail

MISSING=()
WARNINGS=()

# --- Define required vars by environment ---
ALWAYS_REQUIRED=(
  APP_SECRET
  APP_URL
  DATABASE_URL
  AUTH_JWT_SECRET
  AUTH_REFRESH_SECRET
)

PROD_REQUIRED=(
  STRIPE_SECRET_KEY
  STRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET
  SENTRY_DSN
)

# --- Check always-required vars ---
for var in "${ALWAYS_REQUIRED[@]}"; do
  if [ -z "${!var:-}" ]; then
    MISSING+=("$var")
  fi
done

# --- Check prod-only vars ---
if [ "${APP_ENV:-}" = "production" ] || [ "${NODE_ENV:-}" = "production" ]; then
  for var in "${PROD_REQUIRED[@]}"; do
    if [ -z "${!var:-}" ]; then
      MISSING+=("$var (required in production)")
    fi
  done
fi

# --- Validate format/length constraints ---
if [ -n "${AUTH_JWT_SECRET:-}" ] && [ ${#AUTH_JWT_SECRET} -lt 32 ]; then
  WARNINGS+=("AUTH_JWT_SECRET is shorter than 32 chars — insecure")
fi

if [ -n "${DATABASE_URL:-}" ]; then
  if ! echo "$DATABASE_URL" | grep -qE "^(postgres|postgresql|mysql|mongodb|redis)://"; then
    WARNINGS+=("DATABASE_URL doesn't look like a valid connection string")
  fi
fi

if [ -n "${APP_PORT:-}" ]; then
  if ! [[ "$APP_PORT" =~ ^[0-9]+$ ]] || [ "$APP_PORT" -lt 1 ] || [ "$APP_PORT" -gt 65535 ]; then
    WARNINGS+=("APP_PORT=$APP_PORT is not a valid port number")
  fi
fi

# --- Report ---
if [ ${#WARNINGS[@]} -gt 0 ]; then
  echo "WARNINGS:"
  for w in "${WARNINGS[@]}"; do
    echo "  ⚠️  $w"
  done
fi

if [ ${#MISSING[@]} -gt 0 ]; then
  echo ""
  echo "FATAL: Missing required environment variables:"
  for var in "${MISSING[@]}"; do
    echo "  ❌  $var"
  done
  echo ""
  echo "Copy .env.example to .env and fill in missing values."
  exit 1
fi

echo "✅  All required environment variables are set"

Node.js equivalent:

// src/config/validateEnv.ts
const required = [
  'APP_SECRET', 'APP_URL', 'DATABASE_URL',
  'AUTH_JWT_SECRET', 'AUTH_REFRESH_SECRET',
]

const missing = required.filter(key => !process.env[key])

if (missing.length > 0) {
  console.error('FATAL: Missing required environment variables:', missing)
  process.exit(1)
}

if (process.env.AUTH_JWT_SECRET && process.env.AUTH_JWT_SECRET.length < 32) {
  console.error('FATAL: AUTH_JWT_SECRET must be at least 32 characters')
  process.exit(1)
}

export const config = {
  appSecret: process.env.APP_SECRET!,
  appUrl: process.env.APP_URL!,
  databaseUrl: process.env.DATABASE_URL!,
  jwtSecret: process.env.AUTH_JWT_SECRET!,
  refreshSecret: process.env.AUTH_REFRESH_SECRET!,
  stripeKey: process.env.STRIPE_SECRET_KEY,  // optional
  port: parseInt(process.env.APP_PORT ?? '3000', 10),
} as const

Secret Leak Detection

Scan Working Tree

#!/bin/bash
# scripts/scan-secrets.sh
# Scan staged files and working tree for common secret patterns

FAIL=0

check() {
  local label="$1"
  local pattern="$2"
  local matches

  matches=$(git diff --cached -U0 2>/dev/null | grep "^+" | grep -vE "^(\+\+\+|#|\/\/)" | \
    grep -E "$pattern" | grep -v ".env.example" | grep -v "test\|mock\|fixture\|fake" || true)

  if [ -n "$matches" ]; then
    echo "SECRET DETECTED [$label]:"
    echo "$matches" | head -5
    FAIL=1
  fi
}

# AWS Access Keys
check "AWS Access Key" "AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}"
check "AWS Secret Key" "aws_secret_access_key\s*=\s*['\"]?[A-Za-z0-9/+]{40}"

# Stripe
check "Stripe Live Key"   "sk_live_[0-9a-zA-Z]{24,}"
check "Stripe Test Key"   "sk_test_[0-9a-zA-Z]{24,}"
check "Stripe Webhook"    "whsec_[0-9a-zA-Z]{32,}"

# JWT / Generic secrets
check "Hardcoded JWT"     "eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}"
check "Generic Secret"    "(secret|password|passwd|api_key|apikey|token)\s*[:=]\s*['\"][^'\"]{12,}['\"]"

# Private keys
check "Private Key Block" "-----BEGIN (RSA |EC |DSA |OPENSSH )?PRIVATE KEY-----"
check "PEM Certificate"   "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----"

# Connection strings with credentials
check "DB Connection"     "(postgres|mysql|mongodb)://[^:]+:[^@]+@"
check "Redis Auth"        "redis://:[^@]+@\|rediss://:[^@]+@"

# Google
check "Google API Key"    "AIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}"
check "Google OAuth"      "[0-9]+-[0-9A-Za-z_]{32}\.apps\.googleusercontent\.com"

# GitHub
check "GitHub Token"      "gh[ps]_[A-Za-z0-9]{36,}"
check "GitHub Fine-grained" "github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{82}"

# Slack
check "Slack Token"       "xox[baprs]-[0-9A-Za-z]{10,}"
check "Slack Webhook"     "https://hooks\.slack\.com/services/[A-Z0-9]{9,}/[A-Z0-9]{9,}/[A-Za-z0-9]{24,}"

# Twilio
check "Twilio SID"        "AC[a-z0-9]{32}"
check "Twilio Token"      "SK[a-z0-9]{32}"

if [ $FAIL -eq 1 ]; then
  echo ""
  echo "BLOCKED: Secrets detected in staged changes."
  echo "Remove secrets before committing. Use environment variables instead."
  echo "If this is a false positive, add it to .secretsignore or use:"
  echo "  git commit --no-verify  (only if you're 100% certain it's safe)"
  exit 1
fi

echo "No secrets detected in staged changes."

Scan Git History (post-incident)

#!/bin/bash
# scripts/scan-history.sh — scan entire git history for leaked secrets

PATTERNS=(
  "AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}"
  "sk_live_[0-9a-zA-Z]{24}"
  "sk_test_[0-9a-zA-Z]{24}"
  "-----BEGIN.*PRIVATE KEY-----"
  "AIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}"
  "ghp_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}"
  "xox[baprs]-[0-9A-Za-z]{10,}"
)

for pattern in "${PATTERNS[@]}"; do
  echo "Scanning for: $pattern"
  git log --all -p --no-color 2>/dev/null | \
    grep -n "$pattern" | \
    grep "^+" | \
    grep -v "^+++" | \
    head -10
done

# Alternative: use truffleHog or gitleaks for comprehensive scanning
# gitleaks detect --source . --log-opts="--all"
# trufflehog git file://. --only-verified

Pre-commit Hook Installation

#!/bin/bash
# Install the pre-commit hook
HOOK_PATH=".git/hooks/pre-commit"

cat > "$HOOK_PATH" << 'HOOK'
#!/bin/bash
# Pre-commit: scan for secrets before every commit

SCRIPT="scripts/scan-secrets.sh"

if [ -f "$SCRIPT" ]; then
  bash "$SCRIPT"
else
  # Inline fallback if script not present
  if git diff --cached -U0 | grep "^+" | grep -qE "AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}|sk_live_|-----BEGIN.*PRIVATE KEY"; then
    echo "BLOCKED: Possible secret detected in staged changes."
    exit 1
  fi
fi
HOOK

chmod +x "$HOOK_PATH"
echo "Pre-commit hook installed at $HOOK_PATH"

Using pre-commit framework (recommended for teams):

# .pre-commit-config.yaml
repos:
  - repo: https://github.com/gitleaks/gitleaks
    rev: v8.18.0
    hooks:
      - id: gitleaks

  - repo: local
    hooks:
      - id: validate-env-example
        name: "check-envexample-is-up-to-date"
        language: script
        entry: bash scripts/check-env-example.sh
        pass_filenames: false

Credential Rotation Workflow

When a secret is leaked or compromised:

Step 1 — Detect & Confirm

# Confirm which secret was exposed
git log --all -p --no-color | grep -A2 -B2 "AKIA\|sk_live_\|SECRET"

# Check if secret is in any open PRs
gh pr list --state open | while read pr; do
  gh pr diff $(echo $pr | awk '{print $1}') | grep -E "AKIA|sk_live_" && echo "Found in PR: $pr"
done

Step 2 — Identify Exposure Window

# Find first commit that introduced the secret
git log --all -p --no-color -- "*.env" "*.json" "*.yaml" "*.ts" "*.py" | \
  grep -B 10 "THE_LEAKED_VALUE" | grep "^commit" | tail -1

# Get commit date
git show --format="%ci" COMMIT_HASH | head -1

# Check if secret appears in public repos (GitHub)
gh api search/code -X GET -f q="THE_LEAKED_VALUE" | jq '.total_count, .items[].html_url'

Step 3 — Rotate Credential

Per service — rotate immediately:

  • AWS: IAM console → delete access key → create new → update everywhere
  • Stripe: Dashboard → Developers → API keys → Roll key
  • GitHub PAT: Settings → Developer Settings → Personal access tokens → Revoke → Create new
  • DB password: ALTER USER app_user PASSWORD 'new-strong-password-here';
  • JWT secret: Rotate key (all existing sessions invalidated — users re-login)

Step 4 — Update All Environments

# Update secret manager (source of truth)
# Then redeploy to pull new values

# Vault KV v2
vault kv put secret/myapp/prod \
  STRIPE_SECRET_KEY="sk_live_NEW..." \
  APP_SECRET="new-secret-here"

# AWS SSM
aws ssm put-parameter \
  --name "/myapp/prod/STRIPE_SECRET_KEY" \
  --value "sk_live_NEW..." \
  --type "SecureString" \
  --overwrite

# 1Password
op item edit "MyApp Prod" \
  --field "STRIPE_SECRET_KEY[password]=sk_live_NEW..."

# Doppler
doppler secrets set STRIPE_SECRET_KEY="sk_live_NEW..." --project myapp --config prod

Step 5 — Remove from Git History

# WARNING: rewrites history — coordinate with team first
git filter-repo --path-glob "*.env" --invert-paths

# Or remove specific string from all commits
git filter-repo --replace-text <(echo "LEAKED_VALUE==>REDACTED")

# Force push all branches (requires team coordination + force push permissions)
git push origin --force --all

# Notify all developers to re-clone

Step 6 — Verify

# Confirm secret no longer in history
git log --all -p | grep "LEAKED_VALUE" | wc -l  # should be 0

# Test new credentials work
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $NEW_TOKEN" https://api.service.com/test

# Monitor for unauthorized usage of old credential (check service audit logs)