references/verification-checklist.md · 24000
init blocks for secondaryColor, tertiaryColor, or primaryTextColor. ❌ "primaryColor": "#2D3748", "secondaryColor": "#4299E1" → ✅ Only 'background': '#ffffff', 'primaryColor': '#ffffff', 'lineColor': '#666666' in themeVariables
- [ ] Missing summary MMD — Count nodes and subgraphs in
1.1-threatmodel.mmd. If elements > 15 OR subgraphs > 4,1.2-threatmodel-summary.mmdMUST exist. ❌ Threshold met but file missing → ✅ File created with summary diagram - [ ] Standalone sidecar nodes (K8s only) — Search diagrams for nodes named
MISE,Dapr,Envoy,Istio,Sidecaras separate entries. ❌MISE(("MISE Sidecar"))→ ✅InferencingFlow(("Inferencing Flow<br/>+ MISE")) - [ ] Intra-pod localhost flows (K8s only) — Search for
-->|"localhost"|arrows between co-located containers. ❌ Present → ✅ Absent (implicit) - [ ] Missing sequence diagrams — First 3 scenarios in
0.1-architecture.mdmust each have asequenceDiagramblock. ❌ Fewer than 3 → ✅ At least 3 - [ ] Technology-specific gaps — For every technology in the repo (Redis, PostgreSQL, Docker, K8s, ML/LLM, NFS, etc.), verify at least one finding or documented mitigation exists. ❌ Technology present but no coverage → ✅ Each technology addressed
0.7 Canonical Pattern Checks
- [ ] Finding heading pattern — All finding headings match
^### FIND-\d{2}:(neverF01,F-01,Finding 1) - [ ] CVSS prefix pattern — All CVSS fields match
\d+\.\d+ \(CVSS:4\.0/AV:(never bareAV:N/AC:L/...) - [ ] Related Threats link pattern — Every Related Threat token matches
\[T\d{2}\.[STRIDEA]\]\(2-stride-analysis\.md#[a-z0-9-]+\) - [ ] Assessment section headings exact set — Exactly these
##headings in0-assessment.md: Report Files, Executive Summary, Action Summary, Analysis Context & Assumptions, References Consulted, Report Metadata, Classification Reference - [ ] Forbidden headings absent — No
##or###headings containing: Severity Distribution, Architecture Risk Areas, Methodology Notes, Deliverables, Priority Remediation Roadmap, Key Recommendations, Top Recommendations
Phase 1 — Per-File Structural Checks
These checks validate each file independently. They can run in parallel.
1.1 All .md Files
- [ ] No code-fence wrapping: No
.mdfile starts with```markdownor````markdown. Every.mdfile must begin with a# Headingas its very first line. If any file is wrapped in fences, strip the first and last lines immediately. - [ ] No
.mmdcode-fence wrapping: The.mmdfile must NOT start with```plaintextor```mermaid. It must start with%%{init:as the very first characters. If wrapped, strip the fence lines. - [ ] No empty files: Every file has substantive content beyond the heading.
1.2 0.1-architecture.md
- [ ] Required sections present: System Purpose, Key Components, Component Diagram, Top Scenarios, Technology Stack, Deployment Model, Repository Structure
- [ ] Component Diagram exists as a Mermaid
flowchartinside a```mermaidcode fence - [ ] Architecture styles used — NOT DFD circles
(("Name")). Must use["Name"]or(["Name"])withservice/external/datastoreclassDef names - [ ] At least 3 scenarios have Mermaid
sequenceDiagramblocks - [ ] No separate
.mmdfiles were created for 0.1-architecture.md — all diagrams are inline - [ ] Component Diagram elements match Key Components table — every row in the table has a corresponding node in the diagram, and vice versa. Count both and verify counts are equal.
- [ ] Top Scenarios reflect actual code paths, not hypothetical use cases
- [ ] Deployment Model has network details — must mention at least: port numbers OR bind addresses OR network topology
1.3 1.1-threatmodel.mmd
- [ ] File exists with pure Mermaid code (no markdown wrapper, no
```mermaidfence) - [ ] Starts with
%%{init:block - [ ] Contains
classDef process,classDef external,classDef datastore - [ ] Uses DFD shapes: circles
(("Name"))for processes, rectangles["Name"]for externals, cylinders[("Name")]for data stores
1.4 1-threatmodel.md
- [ ] Diagram content identical to
1.1-threatmodel.mmd— byte-for-byte comparison of the Mermaid block content (excluding the```mermaidfence wrapper) - [ ] Element Table present with columns: Element, Type, TMT Category, Description, Trust Boundary
- [ ] Data Flow Table present with columns: ID, Source, Target, Protocol, Description
- [ ] Trust Boundary Table present with columns: Boundary, Description, Contains
- [ ] TMT Category IDs used — Element Table's TMT Category column uses specific TMT element IDs from
tmt-element-taxonomy.md(e.g.,SE.P.TMCore.WebSvc,SE.EI.TMCore.Browser). NOT generic labels likeProcess,External. - [ ] Flow IDs match DF\d{2} pattern — Every flow ID in the Data Flow Table uses
DF01,DF02, etc. format. NOTF1,Flow-1,DataFlow1. - [ ] If >15 elements or >4 boundaries:
1.2-threatmodel-summary.mmdMUST exist AND1-threatmodel.mdMUST include a "Summary View" section with the summary diagram AND a "Summary to Detailed Mapping" table. To verify: count nodes (lines matching[A-Z]\d+with shape syntax) and subgraphs in1.1-threatmodel.mmd. If count exceeds thresholds but1.2-threatmodel-summary.mmddoes not exist → FAIL — create the summary diagram before proceeding.
1.5 2-stride-analysis.md
- [ ] Exploitability Tiers section present at top with tier definition table
- [ ] Summary table appears BEFORE individual component sections (immediately after Exploitability Tiers, NOT at the bottom of the file)
- [ ] Summary table includes columns: Component, Link, S, T, R, I, D, E, A, Total, T1, T2, T3, Risk
- [ ] Every component has
## Component Nameheading followed by Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3 sub-sections (all three present even if empty) - [ ] Empty tiers use "No Tier N threats identified for this component."
- [ ] Anchor-safe headings: No
##heading in this file contains ANY of these characters:&,/,(,),.,:,',",+,@,!. Replace:&→and,/→-, parentheses → omit,:→ omit. - [ ] Pod Co-location line present for K8s components listing co-located sidecars
- [ ] STRIDE Status values — Every threat row's Status column uses exactly one of:
Open,Mitigated,Platform. NoPartial,N/A, or other ad-hoc values. - [ ] A category labeled Abuse — Search
2-stride-analysis.mdfor| Authorization |as a STRIDE category label. FAIL if found. The "A" in STRIDE-A is always "Abuse" (business logic abuse, workflow manipulation, feature misuse), NEVER "Authorization". Also check N/A entries:Authorization — N/Ais WRONG, must beAbuse — N/A. - [ ] STRIDE-Coverage Consistency — For every threat ID, the STRIDE Status and Coverage table Status must agree:
- STRIDE
Open→ Coverage✅ Covered (FIND-XX)(finding documents vulnerability needing remediation) - STRIDE
Mitigated→ Coverage✅ Mitigated (FIND-XX)(finding documents existing control the team built) - STRIDE
Platform→ Coverage🔄 Mitigated by Platform - If STRIDE says
Partialbut Coverage saysMitigated by Platform→ CONFLICT. Fix it. - If STRIDE says
Openbut Coverage says⚠️ Needs Review→ only valid if prerequisites ≠None
- STRIDE
1.6 3-findings.md
- [ ] Organized by tier using exactly:
## Tier 1 — Direct Exposure (No Prerequisites),## Tier 2 — Conditional Risk (...),## Tier 3 — Defense-in-Depth (...) - [ ] NOT organized by severity — no
## Critical Findingsor## Important Findingsheadings - [ ] Every finding has ALL mandatory attributes: SDL Bugbar Severity, CVSS 4.0, CWE, OWASP (with
:2025suffix), Exploitation Prerequisites, Exploitability Tier, Remediation Effort, Mitigation Type, Component, Related Threats - [ ] Mitigation Type valid values — Every finding's
Mitigation Typerow is one of exactly:Redesign,Standard Mitigation,Custom Mitigation,Existing Control,Accept Risk,Transfer Risk. ❌ Abbreviated forms (Custom,Accept,Standard) or invented values → FAIL - [ ] SDL Severity valid values — Every finding's severity is one of:
Critical,Important,Moderate,Low. ❌High,Medium,Info→ FAIL - [ ] Remediation Effort valid values — Every finding's effort is one of:
Low,Medium,High. ❌ Time estimates, sprint labels → FAIL - [ ] CVSS 4.0 has full vector: Every finding's CVSS value includes BOTH the numeric score AND the full vector string (e.g.,
9.3 (CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N)). Score-only is NOT acceptable. - [ ] CWE format: Every CWE uses
CWE-NNN: Nameformat (not just number) - [ ] OWASP format: Every OWASP uses
A0N:2025format (never:2021) - [ ] Related Threats use individual links per threat ID:
[T01.S](2-stride-analysis.md#component-name)— no grouped links like[T01.S, T01.T](2-stride-analysis.md) - [ ] Exploitation Prerequisites present — Every
### FIND-block has a row| Exploitation Prerequisites | - [ ] Component field present — Every
### FIND-block has a row| Component | - [ ] No Tier 1 with AV:L or PR:H — For every Tier 1 finding, verify its CVSS vector does NOT contain
AV:LorPR:H. If found → tier must be downgraded to T2/T3. - [ ] Tier-Prerequisite Consistency (MANDATORY) — For EVERY finding and EVERY threat row, the tier MUST follow mechanically from the prerequisite using the canonical mapping:
None→ T1 (only valid if component's Reachability = External AND Auth = No)Authenticated User,Privileged User,Internal Network,Local Process Access→ T2Host/OS Access,Admin Credentials,Physical Access,{Component} Compromise, anyA + B→ T3- ⛔ FORBIDDEN values:
Application Access,Host Access→ FAIL. Replace withLocal Process Access(T2) orHost/OS Access(T3). - Deployment context rule (Rule 20): If Deployment Classification is
LOCALHOST_DESKTOPorLOCALHOST_SERVICE,Noneis FORBIDDEN for all components. Fix prerequisite toLocal Process AccessorHost/OS Access, then derive tier. - Exposure table cross-check: For each finding, look up its Component in the Component Exposure Table. The finding's prerequisite MUST be ≥ the component's
Min Prerequisite. The finding's tier MUST be ≥ the component'sDerived Tier. - Mismatch = FAIL. Fix by adjusting prerequisites to match deployment evidence, then derive tier from prerequisite.
- Common violations:
Noneon a localhost-only component;Application Access(ambiguous); T1 withInternal Networkprerequisite; T2 withNoneprerequisite.
- [ ] Threat Coverage Verification table present at end of file mapping every threat ID → finding ID with status
- [ ] Coverage table valid statuses ONLY — Every row in the Coverage table must use exactly one of these three statuses:
✅ Covered (FIND-XX),✅ Mitigated (FIND-XX), or🔄 Mitigated by Platform. ❌⚠️ Accepted Risk→ FAIL (tool cannot accept risks). ❌⚠️ Needs Review→ FAIL (every threat must be resolved). ❌—without a status → FAIL (unaccounted threat). - [ ] Mitigated vs Platform distinction — For every
✅ Mitigated (FIND-XX)entry: verify the finding documents an existing security control the engineering team built (auth middleware, TLS, input validation, file permissions). For every🔄 Mitigated by Platform: verify the mitigation is from a genuinely EXTERNAL system (Azure AD, K8s RBAC, TPM). If "Platform" describes THIS repo's code → reclassify as✅ Mitigatedand create a finding. - [ ] Platform Mitigation Ratio Audit (MANDATORY) — Count threats marked
🔄 Mitigated by Platformvs total threats. If Platform > 20% → WARNING: Likely overuse of Platform status. For each Platform-mitigated threat, verify ALL three conditions: (1) mitigation is EXTERNAL to this repo's code, (2) managed by a different team, (3) cannot be disabled by modifying this code. Common violations: "auth middleware" (that's THIS code → should beMitigated), "TLS on localhost" (THIS code → should beMitigated), "file permissions" (THIS code → should beMitigated). - [ ] Coverage Feedback Loop Verification — After the Coverage table is written, verify: (1) every threat with STRIDE status
Openhas a corresponding finding in the table. (2) No—dashes without a status. (3) If gaps exist, new findings were created to fill them. The Coverage table is a FEEDBACK LOOP — its purpose is to catch missed findings and force their creation. If gaps remain after the table is written, the loop was not executed. - [ ] "Accepted Risk" in Coverage table — Grep
3-findings.mdforAccepted Risk. ❌ Any match → FAIL. The tool does NOT have authority to accept risks. EveryOpenthreat MUST have a finding. EveryMitigatedthreat MUST have a finding documenting the team's control. - [ ] "Needs Review" in Coverage table — Grep
3-findings.mdforNeeds Review. ❌ Any match → FAIL. "Needs Review" has been replaced: threats are either Covered (vulnerability), Mitigated (team built a control), or Platform (external system). There is no deferred category.
1.7 0-assessment.md
- [ ] Section order: Report Files → Executive Summary → Action Summary → Analysis Context & Assumptions → References Consulted → Report Metadata → Classification Reference (last)
- [ ] Report Files section is the very first section after the title
- [ ] Risk Rating heading has NO emojis:
### Risk Rating: Elevatednot### Risk Rating: 🟠 Elevated - [ ] Threat count context paragraph present as blockquote at end of Executive Summary
- [ ] No separate Recommendations section — Action Summary IS the recommendations
- [ ] Action Summary table present with Tier, Description, Threats, Findings, Priority columns
- [ ] Action Summary is the ONLY name: No sections titled "Priority Remediation Roadmap", "Top Recommendations", "Key Recommendations", or "Risk Profile"
- [ ] Quick Wins subsection present (or explicitly omitted if no low-effort T1 findings)
- [ ] Needs Verification section present under Analysis Context & Assumptions
- [ ] References Consulted has two subsections:
### Security Standardsand### Component Documentation - [ ] References Consulted tables use three columns with full URLs:
| Standard | URL | How Used |and| Component | Documentation URL | Relevant Section |— NOT a flat| Reference | Usage |table - [ ] Finding Overrides uses table format even when empty (never plain text)
- [ ] Report Metadata is the absolute last section before Classification Reference with all required fields
- [ ] Metadata timestamps came from actual command execution (not derived from folder names)
- [ ] Model field present — value matches the model being used (e.g.,
Claude Opus 4.6,GPT-5.3 Codex,Gemini 3 Pro) - [ ] Analysis Started and Analysis Completed fields present with UTC timestamps from
Get-Datecommands - [ ] Duration field present — computed from Analysis Started and Analysis Completed timestamps
- [ ] Metadata values in backticks — Every value cell in the Report Metadata table must be wrapped in backticks. Spot-check at least 5 rows.
- [ ] Horizontal rules between sections — Count lines matching
---in the file. Must be ≥ 6 (one between each pair of the 7##sections). - [ ] Classification Reference is last section —
## Classification Referencepresent as the final##heading. Contains a single 2-column table (Classification | Values) with rows for: Exploitability Tiers, STRIDE + Abuse, SDL Severity, Remediation Effort, Mitigation Type, Threat Status, CVSS, CWE, OWASP. ❌ Missing section or wrong format → FAIL. - [ ] Classification Reference is static — Values in the table must match the skeleton EXACTLY (copied verbatim). No additional rows, no modified descriptions. Compare against
skeleton-assessment.mdClassification Reference section. - [ ] No forbidden section headings — Search for:
Severity Distribution,Architecture Risk Areas,Methodology Notes,Deliverables,Priority Remediation Roadmap,Key Recommendations,Top Recommendations. Must return 0 matches. - [ ] Action Summary tier priorities are FIXED — In the Action Summary table of
0-assessment.md, verify the Priority column: Tier 1 =🔴 Critical Risk, Tier 2 =🟠 Elevated Risk, Tier 3 =🟡 Moderate Risk. ❌ Tier 1 with Low/Moderate/Elevated → FAIL. ❌ Tier 2 with Critical/Low → FAIL. These are FIXED labels that never change regardless of threat/finding counts. - [ ] Action Summary has all 3 tiers — The Action Summary table MUST have rows for Tier 1, Tier 2, AND Tier 3, even if a tier has 0 threats and 0 findings. Missing tiers → FAIL.
Phase 2 — Diagram Rendering Checks
Run against ALL Mermaid blocks across all files. Can be delegated as a focused sub-task.
2.1 Init Blocks
- [ ] Every flowchart has
%%{init}%%block with'background': '#ffffff'as the first line - [ ] Every sequence diagram has the full
%%{init}%%theme variables block with'background': '#ffffff' - [ ] NO custom color keys in themeVariables — init block must NOT contain
primaryColor(except#ffffff),secondaryColor, ortertiaryColor. All element colors come from classDef only.
2.2 Class Definitions & Color Palette
- [ ] Every
classDefincludescolor:#000000(explicit black text) - [ ] DFD diagrams use
process/external/datastoreclass names - [ ] Architecture diagrams use
service/external/datastoreclass names - [ ] EXACT hex codes used — grep all
#[0-9a-fA-F]{6}values in.mmdfiles. The ONLY allowed fill colors are:#6baed6,#fdae61,#74c476,#ffffff,#000000. The ONLY allowed stroke colors are:#2171b5,#d94701,#238b45,#e31a1c,#666666. If ANY other hex color appears (e.g.,#4299E1,#48BB78,#E53E3E,#2B6CB0), the diagram FAILS this check.
2.3 Styling
- [ ] Every flowchart has
linkStyle default stroke:#666666,stroke-width:2px - [ ] Trust boundary styles use
stroke:#e31a1c,stroke-width:3px(NOT#ff0000orstroke-width:2px) - [ ] Architecture layer styles use light fills with matching borders (not red dashed trust boundaries)
2.4 Syntax Validation
- [ ] All labels quoted:
["Name"],(("Name")),[("Name")],-->|"Label"|,subgraph ID["Title"] - [ ] Subgraph/end pairs matched: Every
subgraphhas a closingend - [ ] No stray characters or unclosed quotes in any Mermaid block
2.5 Kubernetes Sidecar Rules
Skip this section if the target system is NOT deployed on Kubernetes.
- [ ] Every K8s service node annotated with sidecars:
<br/>+ SidecarNamein the node label - [ ] Zero standalone sidecar nodes: Search all diagrams for nodes named
MISE,Dapr,Envoy,Istio,Sidecar— these must NOT exist as separate nodes - [ ] Zero intra-pod localhost flows: No arrows between a container and its sidecars (no
-->|"localhost"patterns) - [ ] Cross-boundary sidecar flows originate from host container: All arrows to external targets (Azure AD, Redis, etc.) come from the host container node, not from a standalone sidecar node
- [ ] Element Table: No separate rows for sidecars — described in host container's description column
Phase 3 — Cross-File Consistency Checks
These checks validate relationships between files. They require reading multiple files together.
3.1 Component Coverage (Architecture → STRIDE → Findings)
- [ ] Every component in
0.1-architecture.mdKey Components table has a corresponding## Componentsection in2-stride-analysis.md - [ ] Every element in the
1-threatmodel.mdElement Table that is a Process has a corresponding## Componentsection in2-stride-analysis.md - [ ] No orphaned components in
2-stride-analysis.mdthat don't appear in the Element Table - [ ] Summary table component count matches the number of
## Componentsections in the file - [ ] Component count exact match — Count rows in
0.1-architecture.mdKey Components table (excluding header/separator). Count##component sections in2-stride-analysis.md(excluding## Exploitability Tiers,## Summary). These counts MUST be equal.
3.2 Data Flow Coverage (STRIDE ↔ DFD)
- [ ] Every Data Flow ID (
DF01,DF02, ...) from the1-threatmodel.mdData Flow Table appears in at least one "Affected Flow" cell in2-stride-analysis.md - [ ] No orphaned flow IDs in STRIDE analysis that aren't defined in the Data Flow Table
3.3 Threat-to-Finding Traceability (STRIDE ↔ Findings)
This is the most critical cross-file check. It ensures no identified threat is silently dropped.
- [ ] Every threat ID in
2-stride-analysis.md(e.g., T01.S, T01.T1, T02.I) is referenced by at least one finding in3-findings.mdvia its Related Threats field - [ ] Collect all threat IDs from all tier tables in
2-stride-analysis.md - [ ] Collect all threat IDs referenced in Related Threats fields in
3-findings.md - [ ] Coverage gap report: List any threat ID present in STRIDE but missing from findings. If gaps exist → either add a finding or group the threat into an existing related finding
3.4 Finding-to-STRIDE Anchor Integrity (Findings → STRIDE)
- [ ] Every Related Threats link in
3-findings.mduses format[ThreatID](2-stride-analysis.md#component-anchor) - [ ] Every
#component-anchorresolves to an actual## Headingin2-stride-analysis.md - [ ] Anchor construction verified: heading → lowercase → spaces to hyphens → strip non-alphanumeric except hyphens
- [ ] Spot-check at least 3 anchors by following the link and confirming the threat ID exists under that heading
3.5 Count Consistency (Assessment ↔ All Files)
- [ ] Element count in Executive Summary matches actual Element Table row count in
1-threatmodel.md - [ ] Finding count in Executive Summary matches actual finding count in
3-findings.md - [ ] Threat count in Executive Summary matches Total from summary table in
2-stride-analysis.md - [ ] Tier counts in threat count context paragraph match actual T1/T2/T3 totals from
2-stride-analysis.md - [ ] Action Summary tier table counts match actual per-tier counts from
3-findings.md(findings column) and2-stride-analysis.md(threats column)
Verification methods for count checks:
- Element count: count
|rows in Element Table of1-threatmodel.md, subtract 2 (header + separator) - Finding count: count
### FIND-headings in3-findings.md - Threat count: read the Totals row in
2-stride-analysis.mdSummary table, take theTotalcolumn value - Tier counts: from same Totals row, take T1, T2, T3 column values
3.6 STRIDE Summary Table Arithmetic
- [ ] Per-row: S + T + R + I + D + E + A = Total for every component
- [ ] Per-row: T1 + T2 + T3 = Total for every component
- [ ] Totals row: Each column sum across all component rows equals the Totals row value
- [ ] Row count cross-check: Number of threat rows in each component's detail tables equals its Total in the summary table
- [ ] No artificial all-1s pattern: Check the Summary table for the pattern where every STRIDE column (S,T,R,I,D,E,A) is exactly 1 for every component. If ALL components have exactly 1 threat in every STRIDE category → FAIL (indicates formulaic "minimum 1 per category" inflation rather than genuine analysis). A valid analysis should have varying counts per category reflecting actual attack surface: some categories may be 0 (with N/A justification), others 2-3. Uniform 1s across all components is a stro