resources/IBC_VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md · 24000
urcePort, packet.SourceChannel, packet.Sequence)
// 2. EFFECT: Delete commitment BEFORE callback
k.DeletePacketCommitment(ctx, packet.SourcePort, packet.SourceChannel, packet.Sequence)
// 3. INTERACTION: Now callback cannot re-enter (commitment gone)
k.callbacks.OnTimeoutPacket(ctx, packet)
return nil
}
**What to Check**:
- [ ] ibc-go version is patched (>= v4.6.0, v5.4.0, v6.3.0, v7.4.0, v8.2.0)
- [ ] ALL IBC callbacks (OnRecvPacket, OnAcknowledgementPacket, OnTimeoutPacket) follow CEI: state mutation BEFORE external callbacks
- [ ] Custom IBC middleware and hooks do NOT introduce new callback-before-finalization patterns
- [ ] If the chain has been upgraded, verify the patch was NOT accidentally reverted (Terra re-introduced the vulnerability during a June 2024 upgrade)
- [ ] CosmWasm-enabled chains with ibc-hooks middleware are at highest risk — CosmWasm submessages enable recursive re-entry
- [ ] Rate limiting (§12) is implemented as defense-in-depth even with patched ibc-go
**Vulnerable chain requirements**: IBC-enabled + vulnerable ibc-go version + CosmWasm-enabled with permissionless uploads + ibc-hooks middleware wrapping ICS-20.
**Two attack vectors**:
- **Native token theft**: Drain all tokens from ICS-20 escrow accounts
- **Infinite IBC token minting**: Mint unbacked IBC tokens, bridge them back to original chains
**Grep Patterns** (use Grep tool with `glob: "*.go"` in `x/`):
- `OnTimeoutPacket|OnAcknowledgementPacket|OnRecvPacket` — IBC callbacks
- `DeletePacketCommitment` — verify commitment deletion happens BEFORE callback invocation
- `ibc-hooks|ibchooks` — hooks middleware presence
**References**:
- [Asymmetric Research — IBC Reentrancy Infinite Mint](https://blog.asymmetric.re/cosmos-ibc-reentrancy-infinite-mint/)
- [GHSA-j496-crgh-34mx](https://github.com/cosmos/ibc-go/security/advisories/GHSA-j496-crgh-34mx)
- [Terra IBC hooks exploit — $6.4M](https://www.theblock.co/post/308440/attacker-exploits-ibc-hooks-vulnerability-to-steal-tokens-on-terra-blockchain)
---
### SUMMARY: MOST DANGEROUS PATTERNS
| # | Pattern | Category | Known Incident / Reference |
|---|---------|----------|---------------------------|
| 1 | Untrusted IBC counterparty chain | Channel | GHSA-5jgq-x857-p8xw |
| 2 | Unsafe LookupModuleByPort/LookupModuleByChannel | Channel | ibc-go#71 |
| 3 | Missing IBC channel close validation | Channel | — |
| 4 | Incorrect IBC packet timeout handling | Channel | — |
| 5 | Incorrect IBC channel ordering type | Channel | — |
| 6 | IBC transfers breaking internal bookkeeping | Denom | SDK#20517 |
| 7 | Non-deterministic JSON in IBC ack middleware | Middleware | ISA-2025-001, ASA-2025-004 |
| 8 | PFM inverted escrow/mint (nonrefundable) | Middleware | PoC available |
| 9 | ICS-20 v2 multi-token partial receive inflation | Middleware | PoC available |
| 10 | Unpermissioned IBC channel opening | Channel | Precondition for ISA-2025-001 |
| 11 | IBC denom / voucher confusion | Denom | ibc-go#7848 |
| 12 | Missing IBC rate limiting | Defense | Would have limited $126M exploit |
| 13 | ICA host allow-all (`"*"`) configuration | ICA | Default genesis config |
| 14 | ICA channel ordering backwards compat | ICA | ibc-go#6714 |
| 15 | ICA authentication module missing | ICA | ICS-27 audit finding |
| 16 | IBC reentrancy / CEI violations | Reentrancy | ASA-2024-007, Terra $6.4M exploit |
---
### References
- **IBC-Go Security Advisories**: https://github.com/cosmos/ibc-go/security/advisories
- **IBC-Go Audit Reports**: https://docs.cosmos.network/ibc/v8.5.x/security-audits
- **Asymmetric Research**: "Cosmos IBC Reentrancy Infinite Mint" — https://blog.asymmetric.re/cosmos-ibc-reentrancy-infinite-mint/
- **Jump Crypto**: "Huckleberry: IBC Event Hallucinations" — https://jumpcrypto.com/resources/huckleberry-ibc-event-hallucinations
- **Cosmos Forum**: IBC Security Advisories — https://forum.cosmos.network/c/security/
- **Osmosis Rate Limits**: https://www.range.org/blog/ibc-rate-limits-introduction-and-state-of-the-art-1-3